role of truth essay

Of Truth, by Francis Bacon

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"Of Truth" is the opening essay in the final edition of the philosopher, statesman, and jurist Francis Bacon's "Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral" (1625). In this essay, as Roosevelt University associate professor of philosophy Svetozar Minkov points out, Bacon addresses the question of "whether it is worse to lie to others or to oneself—to possess truth (and lie, when necessary, to others) or to think one possesses the truth but be mistaken and hence unintentionally convey falsehoods to both oneself and to others" ("Francis Bacon's 'Inquiry Touching Human Nature,'" 2010).

Below, find the full text of Francis Bacon 's essay "Of Truth", in which he argues that people have a natural inclination to lie to others: "a natural though corrupt love, of the lie itself."

"What is truth?" said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Certainly, there be that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief, affecting free-will in thinking as well as in acting. And though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursing wits which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labor which men take in finding out of truth, nor again that when it is found it imposeth upon men's thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor, but a natural though corrupt love of the lie itself. One of the later school of the Grecians examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie's sake. But I cannot tell: this same truth is a naked and open daylight that doth not show the masques and mummeries and triumphs of the world half so stately and daintily as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt that if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves? One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum daemonum [the wine of devils] because it filleth the imagination, and yet it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it that doth the hurt, such as we spake of before. But howsoever these things are thus in men's depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making or wooing of it; the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it; and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it, is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God in the works of the days was the light of the sense; the last was the light of reason; and his Sabbath work ever since is the illumination of his spirit. First he breathed light upon the face of the matter, or chaos; then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his chosen. The poet that beautified the sect that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well, "It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle and the adventures thereof below; but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors and wanderings and mists and tempests in the vale below"*; so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling or pride. Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

To pass from theological and philosophical truth to the truth of civil business: it will be acknowledged, even by those that practice it not, that clear and round dealing is the honor of man's nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it. For these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent, which goeth basely upon the belly and not upon the feet. There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame as to be found false and perfidious; and therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace and such an odious charge. Saith he, "If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much as to say that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards man." For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man. Surely the wickedness of falsehood and breach of faith cannot possibly be so highly expressed as in that it shall be the last peal to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men: it being foretold that when Christ cometh, "He shall not find faith upon the earth."

*Bacon's paraphrase of the opening lines of Book II of "On the Nature of Things" by Roman poet Titus Lucretius Carus.

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Of Truth by Francis Bacon Summary & Analysis

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Of Truth by Francis Bacon: Explained in Easy Language

We have discussed a summary, line-by-line explanation, and the theme of the essay in the following paragraphs, all explained in simple language.

Table of Contents

Of Truth Summary

Francis Bacon observes a common human tendency to favor lies over truth. For instance, Pilate recognized Christ’s innocence but felt pressured to condemn him. It implies sticking to truth is hard, whereas holding lies carries no risk and offers the flexibility to change one’s point of view at will.

Man loves lies because they are attractive and change their color, similar to a diamond or carbuncle. Truth is unchanging and simple, much like a pearl. Despite the advantage of lies, truth is valuable.

Bacon agrees lies can give temporary relief and prevent sadness and hopelessness. Some forms of lies, like poetry, are harmless as their effect is temporary. However, fixed beliefs are harmful.

Bacon asserts the pursuit of truth is man’s supreme virtue. He believes understanding, searching, and living by truth is an achievement and satisfaction.

Honesty in everyday conversation is also necessary for a virtuous life. While it is beneficial, falsehood is shameful and harmful to individuals and society.

Line By Line Explanation 

Francis Bacon begins the essay by referring to the Christ’s trial with a slight modification.

The Jewish chief priests and elders took Jesus to Pilate. Pilate asked Jesus if he was the King of the Jews. Jesus declared he was a king and came to bear witness to the world ( John 18:37 ). Having heard his declaration, Pilate asked him what the truth was ( John 18:38 ).

The Roman governor went outside and told the Jews that he found Jesus had done nothing wrong. Pilate was aware of Jesus’ innocence. Therefore, he tried to free Jesus by using a Passover tradition where he could release a prisoner, and questioned the crowd about Jesus’ supposed crimes.

Even though Pilate knew Jesus was innocent, he did not want to disappoint the Jewish crowd. Therefore, he ordered to crucify Christ. His decision regarding implies a reluctance to stand by the truth.

Bacon’s choice to frame Pilate’s question as “jesting” (Bacon 61) or joking could highlight a broader critique of how people prioritize convenience over upholding truth. People are often not ready to confront the consequences of admitting the truth.

Some people ignore truth and consider a fixed belief a bondage to the free will of thinking and action. They want to think and act freely. It is important to note what we believe is not truth. Bacon probably uses words belief and truth interchangeably.

It is risky to speak the truth, especially when it challenges predominant belief. For example, Galileo faced persecution for asserting heliocentric truth, which means the Earth goes around the Sun.

It requires courage. Therefore, most people prefer to keep quiet to avoid potential risks.

Pilate’s decision to wash his hands publicly and declare himself free of Christ’s blood proves his awareness of the committed injustice. It also suggests his attempt to avert himself from moral responsibility.

Bacon draws a similarity between Pilate and the human tendency to avoid the price of committing to the truth. Pilate was afraid to stand up for the truth because he did not want to lose the support of the Jews.

Bacon mentions that some groups of Greek philosophers had a keen interest in seeking the truth. He probably refers to the “Sceptics” and the “New (or third) Academy” (Pitcher 61n4).

They believed it was hard for people to know the truth. Some intellectuals still exist, but they are not as passionate about it as the Greeks were.

Reasons for Ignoring Truth

Bacon dives into why people prefer falsehood. He argues people ignore truth not because finding truth is a laborious process nor it limits their thoughts. Instead, people lie because one naturally loves to lie. 

Bacon refers to the Greek satirist Lucian. In  Lover of Lies,  Tychiades asks his friend Philokles why man lies even when it does not bring them joy like poets or profit like merchants. He questions why a man prefers lying for the sake of it.

For example, the speaker boasts before the sun in John Donne’s poem “ The Sun Rising ”. It amuses the poet and creates a space where he can imaginatively claim power over the mighty sun. Similarly, a merchant or a company might lie for profit. Lucian suggests that beyond poetry or trade, some lie simply for the lie itself. 

Though Bacon does not explain the reasons, here are some probable reasons. 

First, Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory explains that children learn a behavior, including lying, either by direct experience or observing others. If they observe no consequences for lying, they might learn it is acceptable.

Second, they like to avoid repercussions of being truthful, which we have discussed above.

Third, psychologically, lying can be a defense mechanism to avoid unpleasant situations and maintain one’s subjective reality.

Differences between Truth and Lies

Bacon contrasts truth and lies by comparing them to clear daylight and flattering candlelight. Daylight does not show the masks, mummeries and triumphs of the world as elegantly as candlelight does on stage. 

A masque and mummery are an early form of dramatic performance. 

The soft glow of candlelight can beautify a scene and make things more attractive than they are. This analogy suggests truth shows things as they are and offers an unfiltered view of reality. On the other hand, lies distort perception and provide a filtered view of the truth. 

Bacon gives another analogy between pearl and diamond to differentiate truth and falsity. Truth is like a pearl that is constant and unaffected by light conditions. A diamond or carbuncle changes its appearance in various lighting conditions and attracts people.

The comparison implies that while truth is invaluable, it lacks the glamour of lies. They often seem more appealing because of their ability to deceive. Consequently, people prioritize flashy things such as lies over simplicity and honesty.

Bacon poses a critical question about the role of lies in life. Mind operates on a pleasure principle, seeking joy and avoiding pain. The challenges of life drive us to create fantasies.

Though these falsehoods are lies, they offer comfort and hope, making life bearable. If one removes all these pointless opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations, life would be empty and disillusioned.

For example, in the story “ The Free Radio ,” the protagonist Ramani holds to the false hope of receiving a free radio and becoming a hero, which keeps him spirited despite his poverty.

It raises a question: What kind of falsehood should we allow in our perception of reality?

The section below aims to answer this.

Light-Hearted Lies vs. Serious Lies

Poetry is a light-hearted lie and harmless, as its effects are temporary. However, Philosophers like Plato have been skeptical about poetry, and excluded poets from his ideal  Republic . They often associate poetry with lies. So, St Jerome criticized poetry and said that poetry is the “food of devils” (Pitcher 62n9).

Though it distracts the readers from reality by firing up their imagination, it does not last long. Instead of poetry, those deep-rooted lies are harmful. For instance, Ramani’s firm faith in becoming a film star leads him to sell his only livelihood: his rickshaw.

Lies deeply influence one’s perceptions and actions. It is seductive and ultimately harmful.

The Value of Truth 

On the other hand, pursuing truth brings lasting benefits. Similar to other essays, such as ‘ Of Studies ,’ ‘ Of Friendship ,’ and ‘ Of Marriage and Single Life ,’ where Bacon discusses the benefits of specific topics, in this essay, he also explores the advantages of being truthful.

Truth is self-evident and self-validating; it does not require external validation for its worth. Searching for, understanding, and believing in truth is profoundly rewarding. 

Bacon likens this quest to a romantic relationship. One seeks to know a person deeply, feel the presence of the other, and enjoy being with the person in a romantic pursuit. Similarly, engaging with truth in these ways enriches our lives. 

It emphasizes that just as relationships bring joy and fulfillment, so does the pursuit of truth make one’s understanding and experience of the world deep and meaningful. 

However, I think embracing truth can be challenging. For instance, Galileo’s opposition shows how hard following truth can be, especially when they are against commonly accepted beliefs. Unlike the joy of love, seeking truth often leads to difficult discoveries that demand courage to face.

Nevertheless, seeking truth is a fundamental human nature and a divine intention. He refers to Genesis 1:3 and 1:27 to justify his point (Pitcher 62n10).  

God first created light that lets us see. The last thing he created was the reason. God also gave light to the formless earth and intellectual insight and spiritual enlightenment to humans.

The Benefit of Truth

Knowing oneself is the ultimate aim of man. Another benefit of truth is the one who knows oneself. The person knows everyone because all are one and connected.

Bacon paraphrases the first ten lines of Book II of Lucretius’s  On the Nature of Things  as an example. It mentions watching jerking ships during a storm from the shore and a battle from a castle window are pleasant experiences (Pitcher 62n11).

It is not about enjoying the suffering of others rather realizing one is safe from those troubles.

Witnessing these situations can be a metaphor for observing difficulties from a safe distance. The distance allows viewers to notice these situations safely without being directly involved.

However, the pleasure of viewing things on the downhill from a high hill is incomparable. One can see things clearly down the valley. The metaphorical hill represents a higher level of understanding. From this ideal state, one can understand the mistakes, doubts, and mental disturbances of those below the level.

The state of enlightenment is calm and clear, like a serene air. The high ground of truth is better than the physical viewpoints because of the superiority of intellectual insight over mere physical advantage.

The advantageous position allows one to observe and understand life challenges and the human condition. Therefore, Bacon suggests one should observe others with compassion rather than a sense of pride. Living with kindness towards others, trusting in the divine, and being guided by truth is like living in paradise on earth.

So, it highlights the importance of wisdom, which is attainable through the path of truth.

Benefits of Truth in Everyday Life

In daily interactions, following the path of truth is also necessary. Being open and honest is a noble aspect of human nature. While honesty is universally cherished, lies degrade human dignity. 

It might make the metalwork seem valuable but degrades its value. It suggests that though deceit might offer short-term advantages, it ultimately degrades one’s character.

Taking dishonest paths is akin to the movement of a snake. It needs the support of its belly to move. A lie also requires the help of another lie to justify it. 

This imagery reflects the negative symbolism of the serpent in Christianity. Christians consider snakes to be evil because Satan takes the form of a serpent and instigates Eve to eat the apple.

No other vice makes a person feel as ashamed as being caught lying and betraying trust. Deceit is the ultimate vice, bringing shame and mistrust.

The Moral Implications of Lying 

Montaigne ponders why calling someone a liar is disgraceful. Bacon cites a statement from “Of Giving the lie” Essays II 18, where Montaigne quotes Plutarch (Pitcher 63n14).

To him, lying is akin to defying God while fearing the judgment of humans. A liar has no courage before another man, and one takes it for granted that lying would not affect the judgment day. 

The evil of lying and breaking trust is so great that it could be the final warning for God to judge humanity. Humanity will feel the repercussions of telling lies on the day of Doomsday when God will judge humanity. 

Bacon cites Luke 18:8, emphasizing that when Christ returns to the earth, he shall not find faith in humanity. He believes the world will be full of liars, according to Pitcher (63n15).

It argues that lying is a moral wrong with personal and societal consequences. It makes one internally corrupted and weakens human relationships. Lies also disrespect divine principles and likely invoke divine judgment. 

Therefore, honesty is crucial for both moral integrity and the foundation of society.

What is the main idea of the essay “Of Truth”?

The central idea of the essay is the value and benefits of truthfulness. Truth has value, and there are benefits to being truthful. Lies might offer temporary pleasure. However, truth has a deep and lasting significance for individuals. We have discussed a summary, line-by-line explanation, and the theme of the essay in the following paragraphs, all explained in simple language.

What is the writing style of Francis Bacon in “Of Truth”?

Bacon uses an aphoristic style in the essay. An aphoristic style means conveying complex and deep ideas in just a few words. Bacon uses this method in his essays, including “Of Truth”, “ Of Love ”, “Of Studies”, and others. For instance, the statement from “Of Truth”, “But it is not only the difficulty and labor, which men take in finding out the truth, nor again, that when it is found, it imposes upon men’s thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor; but a natural, though corrupt love, of the lie itself,’ is aphoristic. It captures human nature and our relationship with truth and falsehood and their natural inclination towards falsehood in a brief and thought-provoking manner.

When was “Of Truth” published?

“Of Truth” appeared in the later edition of the essay collection titled  Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral  in 1625, although the collection was first published in 1597.

• Bacon, Francis. “Of Truth.” Francis Bacon: The Essays , edited by John Pitcher, Penguin Books, 1985, pp. 61-63.
• Bandura, Albert. “Social Cognitive theory of Mass Communications.” Media effects: Advances in theory and Research , edited by J. Bryant and D. Zillman,NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001, pp. 121-153.
• Valkenburg, Patti M., and Jessica Taylor Piotrowski. Plugged In: How Media Attract and Affect Youth , Yale University Press, 2017.

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Of Truth, Sir Francis Bacon, Analysis & Summary

Sir Francis Bacon, renowned for his profound worldly wisdom, offers a compelling analysis of the human condition in his essay "Of Truth." Although criticized by some, such as Alexander Pope, for his emphasis on worldly pursuits, Bacon's guidance in navigating critical situations remains invaluable. In this essay, he espouses the virtues of truth and provides practical advice on how to attain success even in the face of adversity.

While Bacon's philosophy often focuses on earthly benefits, it is important to note that he does not neglect the spiritual realm or the fruits of eternal life. In "Of Truth," he places great importance on the pursuit of truth itself, distinguishing it from falsehood and advocating for its consistent presence in all aspects of our lives. Drawing upon solid quotations, he presents a compelling case for the inherent value and necessity of truth.

Furthermore, Bacon directly addresses the skepticism of those who question the nature of truth. Rather than embellishing truth with excessive claims, he presents reality as it is, urging his readers to embrace honesty as the foundation of personal integrity. He emphasizes that only through a commitment to truth can one truly embody honesty, highlighting the inherent honor that comes from speaking the truth.

As we delve further into Bacon's essay, we will uncover the intricacies of his thoughts and the significance of his teachings on truth, which serve as a guiding light for navigating the complexities of life.

Unveiling the Essence of Truth: A Summary and Critical Analysis of "Of Truth" by Sir Francis Bacon

In his thought-provoking essay, "Of Truth," Sir Francis Bacon initiates the discourse by alluding to the historical figure of Pilate, the Ancient Roman Governor. Pilate's failure to fully comprehend and analyze the truth led him to make a critical decision without patiently awaiting its revelation. Bacon suggests that had Pilate possessed a deeper understanding of the truth, he might have refrained from passing judgment on the crucifixion of Christ.

Turning his attention to skeptical minds, Bacon contemplates whether Pilate himself exhibited such skepticism. He acknowledges the existence of individuals who possess wavering beliefs, constantly shifting their perspectives. These individuals perceive steadfast beliefs as a form of mental enslavement and pride themselves on their free-thinking nature. These echoes of skepticism can still be found in the world today, despite the passage of time and the decline of ancient schools of skeptical philosophy.

Bacon's insights shed light on the intricate dynamics of truth and belief, challenging readers to reflect on the nature of certainty and the influence of skepticism in shaping human thought. By delving into the depths of skepticism and its impact on our perception of truth, Bacon encourages us to critically examine our own beliefs and biases.

As we delve further into Bacon's essay, we will explore his nuanced perspectives on truth and its implications for human understanding, ultimately unraveling the multifaceted nature of truth itself.

The Veil of Untruth: Reasons for Withholding the Truth

The reluctance to speak the truth can be attributed to various underlying factors. Sir Francis Bacon delves into this complex phenomenon, offering a critical analysis of the reasons behind people's aversion to truth. One prominent explanation lies in the arduous and time-consuming nature of truth discovery. Bacon's astute observation finds resonance in real-life examples, such as the extensive legal processes that courts undertake to uncover the truth in countless cases. Years of diligent examination and scrutiny are necessary to discern who is truly speaking the truth.

Intriguingly, both the plaintiff and defendant passionately strive to prove their respective claims, underscoring the substantial effort and time required in the pursuit of truth. Bacon's assertion gains credibility as he highlights the challenging nature of unearthing the truth and the inherent complexities surrounding it.

A second reason, as postulated by Bacon, revolves around the inherent difficulty in accepting the truth once it is revealed. People often find it hard to digest and assimilate the truth into their worldview. This hesitance to embrace the truth can be attributed to various psychological and cognitive factors, underscoring the depth of human complexity and the innate resistance to transformative truths.

Bacon also ponders the paradoxical allure of lies and their appeal to human beings. He acknowledges that lies possess a certain magnetic pull, capturing the attention and interest of individuals. Yet, he expresses perplexity over why people would fabricate falsehoods merely for the sake of deceit. While understanding the motives behind poets and traders who employ lies for pleasure or profit, the concept of lying for its own sake remains an enigma to Bacon, challenging the very essence of human behavior.

In this profound exploration of truth and deception, Bacon presents a compelling analysis of the intricate web of motives and complexities that underlie the reluctance to embrace and speak the truth.

The Dichotomy of Truth and Lie: A Delicate Balance

Sir Francis Bacon explores the contrasting nature of truth and lies, shedding light on the allure and appeal of deception. Drawing upon a vivid real-life analogy, Bacon evokes the imagery of a spectacle presented under different lighting conditions. He posits that while the same show in broad daylight appears as it is, the introduction of candlelight transforms it into a captivating experience that entices a larger audience and provides pleasure. Similarly, lies possess an attractive facade, adorned with beauty and charm, captivating the minds of individuals.

Furthermore, Bacon delves into the intricate relationship between truth and lies. He muses that if the truth were blended with a lie, it would still possess the power to delight. This observation highlights the complex interplay between the two, suggesting that the allure of falsehoods can permeate even when intertwined with elements of truth.

Intriguingly, Bacon delves into the human propensity for constructing false beliefs, judgments, and opinions. These self-created constructs provide individuals with hope and a peculiar form of pleasure. Were these illusions to be stripped away, Bacon suggests that individuals would find themselves in a state of misery, deprived of the comforting illusions that afford them solace and gratification.

In this contemplation of truth and lies, Bacon offers a nuanced understanding of their intertwined existence, illuminating the seductive nature of deception and the delicate balance between truth and falsehood that shapes human perceptions and experiences.

The Paradox of Poetry: A Delicate Deception

Sir Francis Bacon delves into the controversial realm of poetry, acknowledging the accusations leveled against it by early writers of the church who deemed it as a dangerous elixir, aptly labeled as the "devil's wine." These writers argued that poetry, with its embellishments and flights of fancy, was inherently deceitful and led individuals astray into a realm of imagination. While Bacon acknowledges the inherent deceptive nature of poetry, he refutes the notion that it is inherently harmful.

Bacon acknowledges that poetry indeed presents a form of artistic falsehood, weaving tales that deviate from reality. However, he argues that the harm lies not in the art form itself, but rather in the lasting impact of lies on the human psyche. He categorizes lies into two distinct types: those that are short-lived and those that linger in the mind, difficult to forget. In Bacon's view, poetry falls into the former category. The lies presented within poetic verses may captivate and entrance momentarily, but they are transient in their influence. As a result, they do not inflict lasting harm upon individuals.

By distinguishing between the transient nature of poetic falsehoods and the enduring impact of lies that embed themselves within the human mind, Bacon challenges the notion that poetry is inherently harmful. He recognizes the allure of poetic deception, yet contends that its fleeting nature ultimately prevents it from causing lasting damage.

In this analysis, Bacon engages with the paradoxical nature of poetry, acknowledging its deceptive qualities while disputing the assertion that it is fundamentally detrimental to the human experience.

The Power of Truth: Humbling Pride

Sir Francis Bacon highlights the profound significance of truth, emphasizing its role in guiding human decision-making and illuminating the depths of our understanding. Drawing upon the notion of light as the initial creation of God, Bacon emphasizes the inherent connection between truth and enlightenment.

Bacon urges individuals to rely upon their rational faculties when making decisions, emphasizing the importance of basing one's actions on truth. He cites the words of Lucretius, who proclaims that the realization of truth is the pinnacle of human pleasure. Through this realization, one becomes acutely aware of the falsehoods that have clouded their beliefs and the frivolous hopes that once gripped them. Truth, in its essence, has the power to dismantle the veils of ignorance and arrogance.

By recognizing and embracing the truth, individuals are humbled and liberated from the shackles of pride. The revelation of truth reveals the fallibility of one's own judgments and dispels illusions of grandeur, fostering a sense of humility and compassion.

In this perspective, Bacon underscores the transformative potential of truth, highlighting its capacity to humble pride and open the path to self-awareness and empathy.

The Significance of Truth: Honoring the Virtuous

Sir Francis Bacon's profound exploration of truth in "Of Truth" highlights its immense significance in various aspects of life. Through a critical analysis of his ideas, we come to recognize the inherent worth of truth and the detrimental consequences of falsehood.

Bacon asserts that falsehood brings disgrace, while truth bestows honor. Even those who are inclined to lie are aware of the value and importance of truth. The recognition of truth extends beyond the realms of theology and philosophy; it permeates every facet of human existence.

Bacon references Montaigne, who remarks that a liar may exhibit bravery in the face of God but cowardice in their interactions with fellow humans. By engaging in falsehood, a liar directly challenges the divine. Despite their awareness of the impending judgment they will face on the Day of Judgment, they persist in promoting deception. This audacity to willingly endure eternal punishment displays a twisted form of courage.

In the concluding part of the essay, Bacon introduces a moral dimension, seeking to persuade and compel his readers to embrace truthfulness. He presents the "fear of doomsday" as a powerful motivator. According to Bacon, liars will ultimately face punishment on the Day of Judgment.

Thus, Bacon underscores the significance of truth, not only as a moral imperative but also as a means to honor and virtuous living, reminding individuals of the consequences they will face for their actions in the eternal realm.

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Francis Bacon

What is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Certainly there be, that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting. And though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there remain certain discoursing wits, which are of the same veins, though there be not so much blood in them, as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labor, which men take in finding out of truth, nor again, that when it is found, it imposeth upon men’s thoughts, that doth bring lies in favor; but a natural though corrupt love, of the lie itself. One of the later school of the Grecians, examineth the matter, and is at a stand, to think what should be in it, that men should love lies; where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie’s sake. But I cannot tell; this same truth, is a naked, and open day-light, that doth not show the masks, and mummeries, and triumphs, of the world, half so stately and daintily as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond, or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men’s minds, vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds, of a number of men, poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?

One of the fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum doemonum , [the devils wine] because it filleth the imagination; and yet, it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in, and settleth in it, that doth the hurt; such as we spake of before. But, howsoever these things are thus in men’s depraved judgments, and affections, yet truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making, or wooing of it, the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it, and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it, is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God, in the works of the days, was the light of the sense; the last, was the light of reason; and his sabbath work ever since, is the illumination of his Spirit. First he breathed light, upon the face of the matter or chaos; then he breathed light, into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light, into the face of his chosen. The poet, that beautified the sect, that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well: It is a pleasure, to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure, to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures thereof below: but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests, in the vale below; so always that this prospect be with pity, and not with swelling, or pride. Certainly, it is heaven upon earth, to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.

To pass from theological, and philosophical truth, to the truth of civil business; it will be acknowledged, even by those that practise it not, that clear, and round dealing, is the honor of man’s nature; and that mixture of falsehoods, is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better, but it embaseth it. For these winding, and crooked courses, are the goings of the serpent; which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the feet. There is no vice, that doth so cover a man with shame, as to be found false and perfidious. And therefore Montaigne saith prettily, when he inquired the reason, why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace, and such an odious charge? Saith he, If it be well weighed, to say that a man lieth, is as much to say, as that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards men. For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man. Surely the wickedness of falsehood, and breach of faith, cannot possibly be so highly expressed, as in that it shall be the last peal, to call the judgments of God upon the generations of men; it being foretold, that when Christ cometh, he shall not find faith upon the earth.

MLA Citation

Bacon, Francis. “Of truth.” 1601. Quotidiana. Ed. Patrick Madden. 22 Jan 2007. 08 Aug 2024 <http://essays.quotidiana.org/bacon/truth/>.

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• Introduction

The correspondence theory

Coherence and pragmatist theories, tarski and truth conditions.

• Deflationism

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Truth
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truth , in metaphysics and the philosophy of language , the property of sentences, assertions, beliefs , thoughts, or propositions that are said, in ordinary discourse, to agree with the facts or to state what is the case.

Truth is the aim of belief; falsity is a fault. People need the truth about the world in order to thrive . Truth is important. Believing what is not true is apt to spoil people’s plans and may even cost them their lives. Telling what is not true may result in legal and social penalties. Conversely, a dedicated pursuit of truth characterizes the good scientist, the good historian, and the good detective. So what is truth, that it should have such gravity and such a central place in people’s lives?

The classic suggestion comes from Aristotle (384–322 bce ): “To say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true.” In other words, the world provides “what is” or “what is not,” and the true saying or thought corresponds to the fact so provided. This idea appeals to common sense and is the germ of what is called the correspondence theory of truth. As it stands, however, it is little more than a platitude and far less than a theory. Indeed, it may amount to merely a wordy paraphrase, whereby, instead of saying “that’s true” of some assertion, one says “that corresponds with the facts.” Only if the notions of fact and correspondence can be further developed will it be possible to understand truth in these terms.

Unfortunately, many philosophers doubt whether an acceptable explanation of facts and correspondence can be given. Facts, as they point out, are strange entities. It is tempting to think of them as structures or arrangements of things in the world. However, as the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, structures have spatial locations, but facts do not. The Eiffel Tower can be moved from Paris to Rome, but the fact that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris cannot be moved anywhere. Furthermore, critics urge, the very idea of what the facts are in a given case is nothing apart from people’s sincere beliefs about the case, which means those beliefs that people take to be true. Thus, there is no enterprise of first forming a belief or theory about some matter and then in some new process stepping outside the belief or theory to assess whether it corresponds with the facts. There are, indeed, processes of checking and verifying beliefs, but they work by bringing up further beliefs and perceptions and assessing the original in light of those. In actual investigations, what tells people what to believe is not the world or the facts but how they interpret the world or select and conceptualize the facts.

Starting in the mid-19th century, this line of criticism led some philosophers to think that they should concentrate on larger theories, rather than sentences or assertions taken one at a time. Truth, on this view, must be a feature of the overall body of belief considered as a system of logically interrelated components—what is called the “web of belief.” It might be, for example, an entire physical theory that earns its keep by making predictions or enabling people to control things or by simplifying and unifying otherwise disconnected phenomena. An individual belief in such a system is true if it sufficiently coheres with, or makes rational sense within, enough other beliefs; alternatively, a belief system is true if it is sufficiently internally coherent . Such were the views of the British idealists , including F.H. Bradley and H.H. Joachim, who, like all idealists, rejected the existence of mind-independent facts against which the truth of beliefs could be determined ( see also realism: realism and truth ).

Yet coherentism too seems inadequate, since it suggests that human beings are trapped in the sealed compartment of their own beliefs, unable to know anything of the world beyond. Moreover, as the English philosopher and logician Bertrand Russell pointed out, nothing seems to prevent there being many equally coherent but incompatible belief systems. Yet at best only one of them can be true.

Some theorists have suggested that belief systems can be compared in pragmatic or utilitarian terms. According to this idea, even if many different systems can be internally coherent, it is likely that some will be much more useful than others. Thus, one can expect that, in a process akin to Darwinian natural selection , the more useful systems will survive while the others gradually go extinct. The replacement of Newtonian mechanics by relativity theory is an example of this process. It was in this spirit that the 19th-century American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce said:

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.

In effect, Peirce’s view places primary importance on scientific curiosity , experimentation, and theorizing and identifies truth as the imagined ideal limit of their ongoing progress. Although this approach may seem appealingly hard-headed, it has prompted worries about how a society, or humanity as a whole, could know at a given moment whether it is following the path toward such an ideal. In practice it has opened the door to varying degrees of skepticism about the notion of truth. In the late 20th century philosophers such as Richard Rorty advocated retiring the notion of truth in favour of a more open-minded and open-ended process of indefinite adjustment of beliefs. Such a process, it was felt, would have its own utility , even though it lacked any final or absolute endpoint.

The rise of formal logic (the abstract study of assertions and deductive arguments) and the growth of interest in formal systems (formal or mathematical languages) among many Anglo-American philosophers in the early 20th century led to new attempts to define truth in logically or scientifically acceptable terms. It also led to a renewed respect for the ancient liar paradox (attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Epimenides ), in which a sentence says of itself that it is false, thereby apparently being true if it is false and false if it is true. Logicians set themselves the task of developing systems of mathematical reasoning that would be free of the kinds of self-reference that give rise to paradoxes such as that of the liar. However, this proved difficult to do without at the same time making some legitimate proof procedures impossible. There is good self-reference (“All sentences, including this, are of finite length”) and bad self-reference (“This sentence is false”) but no generally agreed-upon principle for distinguishing them.

These efforts culminated in the work of the Polish-born logician Alfred Tarski , who in the 1930s showed how to construct a definition of truth for a formal or mathematical language by means of a theory that would assign truth conditions (the conditions in which a given sentence is true) to each sentence in the language without making use of any semantic terms, notably including truth, in that language. Truth conditions were identified by means of “T-sentences.” For example, the English-language T-sentence for the German sentence Schnee ist weiss is: “Schnee ist weiss” is true if and only if snow is white. A T-sentence says of some sentence (S) in the object language (the language for which truth is being defined) that S is true if and only if…, where the ellipsis is replaced by a translation of S into the language used to construct the theory (the metalanguage ). Since no metalanguage translation of any S (in this case, snow is white ) will contain the term true, Tarski could claim that each T-sentence provides a “partial definition” of truth for the object language and that their sum total provides the complete definition.

While the technical aspects of Tarski’s work were much admired and have been much discussed, its philosophical significance remained unclear, in part because T-sentences struck many theorists as less than illuminating . But the weight of philosophical opinion gradually shifted, and eventually this platitudinous appearance was regarded as a virtue and indeed as indicative of the whole truth about truth. The idea was that, instead of staring at the abstract question “What is truth?,” philosophers should content themselves with the particular question “What does the truth of S amount to?”; and for any well-specified sentence, a humble T-sentence will provide the answer.

Be thinking

What is truth (on the nature and importance of truth today).

Have you ever been told that truth is relative? That it's all based on language and context? That it's only what a culture believes to be real? Douglas Groothuis tackles these issues and more as he examines the question, "What is truth?".

Truth is so obscured nowadays, and lies so well established, that unless we love the truth, we shall never recognize it . Blaise Pascal

Staring Truth in the Face

"Everyone on the side of truth listens to me." Jesus Christ made this statement after Pontius Pilate had interrogated him prior to the crucifixion (John 18:37, NIV). Pilate then famously replied, "What is truth?" and left the scene.

As philosopher Francis Bacon wrote in his essay 'On Truth':

"What is truth?" said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer .

Although Jesus made no reply to Pilate, Christians affirm that Pilate was staring truth in the face, for Jesus had earlier said to his disciple Thomas, "I am the way and the truth and the life" (John 14:6).

This historic exchange raises the perennial question of the very nature of truth itself. What does it mean for a statement to be true? Or, to put it another way: What does it take for a statement to achieve truthfulness?

This has been a subject of much debate in postmodernist circles, where the traditional view of truth as objective and knowable is no longer accepted. Many even outside of academic discussions may be as cynical about truth as Pilate. "What is truth?" they smirk, without waiting for an answer. Postmodernist philosopher Richard Rorty claimed that truth is what his colleagues let him get away with. [1] Unless we are clear about the notion of truth, any claim to truth – religious or otherwise – will perplex more than enlighten.

Before attempting to determine which claims are true, we need to understand the nature of truth itself. I will briefly argue for the correspondence view of truth and then pit it against two of its main rivals, relativism and pragmatism.

Truth and Correspondence

The correspondence view of truth, held by the vast majority of philosophers and theologians throughout history, holds that any declarative statement is true if and only if it corresponds to or agrees with factual reality, with the way things are. The statement, "The desk in my study is brown" , is true only if there is, in fact, a brown desk in my study. If indeed there is a brown desk in my study, then the statement, "there is no brown desk in my study" , is false because it fails to correspond to any objective state of affairs.

Minds may recognize this truth, but minds do not create this truth

The titanic statement, "Jesus is Lord of the universe" , is either true or false. It is not both true and false; it is not neither true nor false. This statement either honors reality or it does not; it mirrors the facts or it does not. The Christian claims that this statement is true apart from anyone's opinion (see Romans 3:4). In other words, it has a mind-independent reality. Minds may recognize this truth, but minds do not create this truth. This is because truth is a quality of some statements and not of others. It is not a matter of subjective feeling, majority vote or cultural fashion. The statement, "The world is spherical" , was true even when the vast majority of earthlings took their habitat to be flat.

The correspondence view of truth entails that declarative statements are subject to various kinds of verification and falsification. This concerns the area of epistemology, or the study of how we acquire and defend knowledge claims. [2] A statement can be proven false if it can be shown to disagree with objective reality. The photographs from outer space depicting the earth as a blue orb (along with prior evidence) falsified flat-earth claims. Certainly, not all falsification is as straightforward as this; but if statements are true or false by virtue of their relationship to what they attempt to describe, this makes possible the marshaling of evidence for their veracity or falsity. [3]

Therefore, Christians – who historically have affirmed the correspondence view of truth – hold that there are good historical reasons to believe that Jesus Christ rose from the dead in space-time history, thus vindicating His divine authority (see Romans 1:4; 1 Corinthians 15:1-11). [4] The Apostle Paul adamantly affirms this view:

And if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is useless and so is your faith. More than that, we are then found to be false witnesses about God, for we have testified about God that he raised Christ from the dead. (1 Corinthians 15:14-15)

Without the correspondence view of truth, these resounding affirmations ring hollow. Christianity cannot live and thrive without it.

Postmodernism: Truth in Doubt

Today this view of truth is being brought into doubt. Postmodernist philosophers claim that the quest for objective truth asserted through language is part of the discredited project of modernism, an over-confident approach to knowledge stemming from enlightenment rationalism. [5] Therefore, statements about scientific facts, religious claims or moral principles cannot refer to objective states of affairs. On the contrary, language is constructed through communities, and it cannot move beyond its own context and refer to realities outside itself.

A thorough analysis of the postmodernist assault on truth would take us beyond the limits of this article, [6] but a basic critique of this notion of truth is that this view is self-refuting. If all language fails to describe objective conditions, due to its immersion in various cultures, then any language used to describe this universal immersion would be subject to the limitations of its context. And that would mean that any and all language fails to describe the universal limitations of all languages. This kind of statement, therefore, discredits itself. For all its protests about the illegitimacies of "metanarratives" (worldviews), postmodernism offers a metanarrative of its own – one that cannot be true given its own precepts. [7]

Moreover, the notion that objective truth is unknowable entails that a relativistic and/or pragmatic view of truth be put in the place of a correspondence view. I contend that both of these views – that is, relativism and pragmatism – are logically defective and unworthy of belief.

Relativism: Who's to Say?

Relativism comes in various shapes and sizes, but its salient claim is that the truth of a statement depends on the views of persons or cultures, not on whether statements correspond to objective reality. To say a statement is true is simply to say that a person or culture believes it to be true. Hence the popular refrain, "Well, that's true for you."

According to this view, one person can say "Jesus is Lord" and another can say "Allah is Lord" , and both statements will be true, if they accurately express the sentiments of the speakers. This view seems to advance tolerance and civility, but it does so at the expense of logic, meaning and truth. That price is too high.

If I say "Jesus is Lord" and you say "Allah is Lord" , both statements cannot be objectively true because they describe mutually exclusive realities. Jesus is known by Christians as God made flesh (John 1:14), while Muslims deny that Allah incarnates. [8] So, if "Lord" means a position of unrivaled metaphysical and spiritual supremacy, then Jesus and Allah cannot both be Lord because "Jesus" and "Allah" are not two words that mean the same thing.

If we mean to say that I believe in Jesus and you believe in Allah, there is no logical contradiction, since subjective beliefs cannot contradict each other; that is, it may be true that I subjectively believe X and you subjectively believe non-X. However, X and non-X themselves cannot both be objectively true. When dealing with divergent claims to objective truth, contradictions emerge frequently. [9] A 2002 survey by Barna Research found that 44 percent of Americans contend that "the Bible, the Koran and the Book of Mormon are all different expressions of the same spiritual truths." This reveals an untrue view of truth.

Applied to medicine or science, this sort of relativistic attitude would be deemed ridiculous. Medical doctors have good reason not to bleed their patients, as was commonly done for centuries. This is because we objectively know that bleeding does not help patients, whatever the social consensus may have been at an earlier time.

Truth is what corresponds to reality

Unlike the correspondence view of truth, which seeks objective support for the truth or falsity of statements (whenever possible), relativism offers no means of verifying or falsifying any belief apart from discerning whether one holds the belief or whether a particular culture tends to affirm certain things.

The Weakness of Pragmatism

A pragmatic view of truth also rejects the objectivity of truth. This view holds that a belief is true only if it works for a particular person. Therefore, Christianity may be "true for me" if it helps me, but false for another if it doesn't seem to help her. But this view confuses usefulness with verity.

Think of a person who chronically mismanages his money and is very unsuccessful. A few hundred dollars are stolen from him without his knowledge. Yet he thinks he has misplaced the money and says to himself, "That's the last straw. I've got to get my life in order!" After this, he becomes successful through hard work and diligence. Yet his belief that he lost the money, however beneficial, was not true because it did not conform to the reality that the money was stolen. This shows that the truth-value of a belief is different from its use-value. [10]

Truth Defined

So, "What is truth?" Truth is what corresponds to reality. When this is established, we can move on to considering which particular statements are true and reasonable and which are not. Unlike Pilate, we can stay and listen to what Jesus has to say to us. He alone has the words of eternal life (John 6:68).

[1] This is a paraphrase, but represents his views truly. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (New York: Princeton University Press, 1979), p.176.

[2] For a superb introduction to epistemology in relation to postmodernism, see R. Douglas Geivett, 'Is God a Story? Postmodernity and the Task of Theology', in Myron Penner, ed., Christianity and the Postmodern Turn (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2005), pp.37-52.

[3] For an introduction to the role of logic in the testing of worldviews, see Ronald Nash, World-Views in Conflict: Choosing Christianity in a World of Ideas (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1992), especially pp.54-106.

[4] See J.P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids, Baker Books, 1987), Chapter 6; N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Fortress, 2003).

[5] See Douglas Groothuis, Truth Decay (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), Chapter 2.

[6] See Groothuis, Truth Decay .

[7] See James Sire, The Universe Next Door, 4th ed . (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), p.237.

[8] See Abduhl Saleeb and Norman Geisler, Answering Islam, 2nd ed . (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2002).

[9] On this see the booklet by Douglas Groothuis, Are All Religions One? (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996), and Ajith Fernando, Sharing the Truth in Love: How to Relate to People of Other Faiths (Grand Rapids, MI: Discovery House, 2001).

[10] See Winfried Corduan, No Doubt About It (Nashville, TN: Broadman, Holman, 1997), pp.60-61.

© 2007 Douglas Groothuis This article is an updated, edited and revised version of the essay, "What is Truth?" which originally appeared on LeaderU.com.

Douglas Groothuis

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Besides emulating the character of God, truthtelling is critical for a flourishing society. Therefore, except in rare circumstances, God mandates it. Though God’s command would be a sufficient motivation, theologians and philosophers have identified other reasons as well.

• Authentic Communication Requires Truthtelling

Truthtelling is essential for authentic communication to occur, and makes genuine interaction between people possible. That is, if truth were not expected, it would not be long before communication would entirely break down. Imagine what it would be like living in a society in which no one expected the truth. How could a person discern what is accurate and what is a falsehood? On what basis could a person make important decisions if there was no expectation of the truth? Life would be chaotic without the norm of honesty.

This is essentially the view of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, and the principle of universalizability of truthtelling (though he would not support the notion given here that there are exceptions to the universal norm). Kant argued that this principle was the test of a valid moral principle, and used truthtelling as one of his primary illustrations. He insisted that for a norm to be legitimate, it must be universalizable—applicable to everyone. One of his illustrations envisioned what might happen if no one accepted the norm in question. He correctly argued that without a universal norm of truthtelling, the basis for communication would be in jeopardy, and a society in which this was not a norm would not be functional. [1] This is recognized by the fact that virtually every civilization has some kind of norm that promotes truthtelling and prohibits deception. [2]

• Trust and Cooperation Require Truthtelling

Truthtelling builds trust and civil cooperation among human beings. Trust is critical for a prosperous society, and being a person of one’s word establishes trust and trustworthiness. [1] The Mosaic Law underscored this in Deuteronomy 25:15, connecting honest dealings with Israel’s prosperity in the land. “You shall have only a full and honest weight; you shall have only a full and honest measure, so that your days may be long in the land that the Lord your God is giving you” (also see Leviticus 19:36). Similarly Proverbs brings out the connection between trustworthiness and social harmony. Proverbs 3:29 emphasizes that trust among neighbors is what enables them to live in peace, not fearing harm from one’s neighbor. Further, Proverbs emphasize that trustworthiness brings healing to both relationships and communities (Prov. 13:17, 25:13). Adam Smith was very clear that honest dealings and trustworthiness were critical for a properly functioning market system. Cultures that are given to corruption are often in the most impoverished parts of the world, since it is more difficult and risky to do business in cultures in which the level of trust is low. Similarly, companies in which there is a culture of distrust typically have higher costs of doing business, since they require costly regimens of oversight. They also have intangible costs, as employees tend to be more reluctant to “go the extra mile” for their employer and tend to be less eager to embrace change and less committed to their work.

• Human Dignity Requires Truthtelling

Truthtelling treats people with dignity. To tell someone the truth is a measure of respect that is missing when someone is lied to.

The Scriptures illustrate this with the Genesis account of Jacob and his service to Laban (Genesis 29-30). Jacob works seven years for the right to marry Rachel and after the years of service are complete, Laban deceives Jacob and substitutes his less desirable daughter Leah as Jacob’s bride. Jacob is justifiably outraged at being deceived and treated with such disrespect (Gen. 29:25). Jacob returns the disrespect to Laban in Genesis 30 when he deceives Laban with respect to the flocks that Jacob is tending for Laban, separating out the stronger flocks for himself and leaving the weaker ones for Laban (Gen. 30:42).

Similarly in 2 Kings 12, when it came to the money for the repair of the temple, there were certain workmen who were so trustworthy that the overseers of the repairs did not need an accounting of the money they spent for the repairs. Because they were honest, they were treated with dignity and trust by the king and by the priests in charge of temple repair (also 2 Kings 22:7). This is also borne out by the proverb that warns a person, “Well meant are the wounds a friend inflicts, but profuse are the kisses of an enemy” (Proverbs 27:6). The enemy who multiplies kisses is the one who showers a person with false flattery, deceiving the person into the illusion of friendship and trust, when in reality, he is the enemy. Here, deception treats the person being deceived as a pawn to be manipulated for the deceiver’s own selfish purposes, not as someone with dignity who is deserving of respect. Disrespect also comes through in, “A lying tongue hates its victims; and a flattering mouth works ruin” (Prov. 26:28; also Prov. 26:18-19, 24, 26).

The right of a person to make his or her own autonomous decisions is based on having accurate information, so much so that people often and understandably feel violated and disrespected when they are deceived. A person’s autonomy is weakened when they are deceived. This is evident in the example of Jacob and Laban. Jacob’s autonomy to marry the woman of his choice was completely undermined by Laban’s deception, since Jacob would never have married Leah if left entirely to his own choice (Genesis 29:17-20). It is further evident in Jacob’s reciprocal deception of Laban, since Laban would not have managed the flocks to his obvious financial disadvantage had he not been deceived so effectively by Jacob (Gen. 30:42-43).

Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals , tr. James W. Ellington, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993, original, 1785), 30-36. See also, Kant’s essay, “On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Altruistic Motives,” ibid.

See C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1943). See especially the appendix for a listing of the virtues in common to most of the world’s major civilizations. There are rare exceptions to this—a few cultures hold treachery and deceit as virtues. See for example, Don Richardson, Peace Child: An Unforgettable Story of Primitive Jungle Treachery , 4th edition (Ventura, California: Regal, 2005).

For more on this, see Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995).

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Table of Contents

• Truthtelling in the Bible
• Truthtelling is the Norm in the Bible
• Exceptions to Truthtelling in the Bible
• Truthtelling in the Workplace
• Financial Statements Must Tell the Truth
• There May Be Exceptions to Truthtelling in the Workplace
• Puffery/Exaggeration
• When Someone Has No Right to the Truth
• Deception to Obtain Information You Have a Right to Know
• Information You Have No Right to Know
• Social Implications of Protecting Information Others Have No Right to Know
• Conclusions About Truth & Deception
• Key Biblical Texts on Truth & Deception

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Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.

It would be impossible to survey all there is to say about truth in any coherent way. Instead, this essay will concentrate on the main themes in the study of truth in the contemporary philosophical literature. It will attempt to survey the key problems and theories of current interest, and show how they relate to one-another. A number of other entries investigate many of these topics in greater depth. Generally, discussion of the principal arguments is left to them. The goal of this essay is only to provide an overview of the current theories.

The problem of truth is in a way easy to state: what truths are, and what (if anything) makes them true. But this simple statement masks a great deal of controversy. Whether there is a metaphysical problem of truth at all, and if there is, what kind of theory might address it, are all standing issues in the theory of truth. We will see a number of distinct ways of answering these questions.

1.1 The correspondence theory

1.1.1 the origins of the correspondence theory, 1.1.2 the neo-classical correspondence theory, 1.2 the coherence theory, 1.3 pragmatist theories, 2.1 sentences as truth-bearers, 2.2 convention t, 2.3 recursive definition of truth, 2.4 reference and satisfaction, 3.1 correspondence without facts, 3.2 facts again, 3.3. truthmakers, 4.1 realism and truth, 4.2 anti-realism and truth, 4.3 anti-realism and pragmatism, 5.1 the redundancy theory, 5.2 minimalist theories, 5.3 other aspects of deflationism, 6.1 truth-bearers, 6.2 truth and truth conditions, 6.3 truth conditions and deflationism, 6.4 truth and the theory of meaning, 6.5 the coherence theory and meaning, 6.6 truth and assertion, bibliography, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the neo-classical theories of truth.

Much of the contemporary literature on truth takes as its starting point some ideas which were prominent in the early part of the 20th century. There were a number of views of truth under discussion at that time, the most significant for the contemporary literature being the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist theories of truth.

These theories all attempt to directly answer the nature question : what is the nature of truth? They take this question at face value: there are truths, and the question to be answered concerns their nature. In answering this question, each theory makes the notion of truth part of a more thoroughgoing metaphysics or epistemology. Explaining the nature of truth becomes an application of some metaphysical system, and truth inherits significant metaphysical presuppositions along the way.

The goal of this section is to characterize the ideas of the correspondence, coherence and pragmatist theories which animate the contemporary debate. In some cases, the received forms of these theories depart from the views that were actually defended in the early 20th century. We thus dub them the ‘neo-classical theories’. Where appropriate, we pause to indicate how the neo-classical theories emerge from their ‘classical’ roots in the early 20th century.

Perhaps the most important of the neo-classical theories for the contemporary literature is the correspondence theory. In spite of its importance, it is strikingly difficult to find an accurate citation in the early 20th century for the received neo-classical view. Furthermore, the way the correspondence theory actually emerged will provide some valuable reference points for contemporary debate. For these reasons, we dwell on the origins of the correspondence theory at greater length than those of the other neo-classical views, before turning to its contemporary neo-classical form.

The basic idea of the correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it corresponds to the way things actually are—to the facts. This idea can be seen in various forms throughout the history of philosophy. Its modern history starts with the beginnings of analytic philosophy at the turn of the 20th century, particularly in the work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.

Let us pick up the thread of this story in the years between 1898 and about 1910. These years are marked by Moore and Russell's rejection of idealism. Yet at this point, they do not hold a correspondence theory of truth. Indeed Moore (1899) sees the correspondence theory as a source of idealism, and rejects it. Russell follows Moore in this regard. (For discussion of Moore's early critique of idealism, where he rejects the correspondence theory of truth, see Baldwin (1991). Hylton (1990) provides an extensive discussion of Russell in the context of British idealism.)

In this period, Moore and Russell hold a version of the identity theory of truth . They say comparatively little about it, but it is stated briefly in Moore (1902); Moore (1899) and Russell (1904). According to the identity theory, a true proposition is identical to a fact. Specifically, in Moore and Russell's hands, the theory begins with propositions, understood as the objects of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. Propositions are what are believed, and give the contents of beliefs. They are also, according to this theory, the primary bearers of truth. When a proposition is true, it is identical to a fact, and a belief in that proposition is correct.

The identity theory Moore and Russell espoused takes truth to be a property of propositions. Furthermore, taking up an idea familiar to readers of Moore, the property of truth is a simple unanalyzable property. Facts are understood as simply those propositions which are true. There are true propositions and false ones, and facts just are true propositions. There is thus no “difference between truth and the reality to which it is supposed to correspond” (Moore, 1902, p. 21). (For further discussion of the identity theory of truth, see Baldwin (1991), Cartwright (1987), and the entry on the identity theory of truth .)

Moore and Russell came to reject the identity theory of truth in favor of a correspondence theory, sometime around 1910 (as we see in Moore, 1953, which reports lectures he gave in 1910-1911, and Russell, 1910b). They do so because they came to reject the existence of propositions. Why? Among reasons, they came to doubt that there could be any such things as false propositions, and then concluded that there are no such things as propositions at all.

Why did Moore and Russell find false propositions problematic? A full answer to this question is a point of scholarship that would take us too far afield. (Moore himself lamented that he could not “put the objection in a clear and convincing way” (1953, p. 263), but see Cartwright (1987) for a careful and clear exploration of the arguments.) But very roughly, the identification of facts with true propositions left them unable to see what a false proposition could be other than something which is just like a fact, though false. If such things existed, we would have fact-like things in the world, which Moore and Russell now see as enough to make false propositions count as true. Hence, they cannot exist, and so there are no false propositions. As Russell (1956, p. 223) later says, propositions seem to be at best “curious shadowy things” in addition to facts.

As Cartwright (1987) reminds us, it is useful to think of this argument in the context of Russell's slightly earlier views about propositions. As we see clearly in Russell (1903), for instance, he takes propositions to have constituents. But they are not mere collections of constituents, but a ‘unity’ which brings the constituents together. (We thus confront the ‘problem of the unity of the proposition’.) But what, we might ask, would be the ‘unity’ of a proposition that (Samuel) Ramey sings—with constituents Ramey and singing—except Ramey bearing the property of singing? If that is what the unity consists in, then we seem to have nothing other than the fact that Ramey sings. But then we could not have genuine false propositions without having false facts.

As Cartwright also reminds us, there is some reason to doubt the cogency of this sort of argument. But let us put the assessment of the arguments aside, and continue the story. From the rejection of propositions a correspondence theory emerges. The primary bearers of truth are no longer propositions, but beliefs themselves. In a slogan:

A belief is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact .

Views like this are held by Moore (1953) and Russell (1910b); Russell (1912). Of course, to understand such a theory, we need to understand the crucial relation of correspondence, as well as the notion of a fact to which a belief corresponds. We now turn to these questions. In doing so, we will leave the history, and present a somewhat more modern reconstruction of a correspondence theory.

The correspondence theory of truth is at its core an ontological thesis: a belief is true if there exists an appropriate entity—a fact—to which it corresponds. If there is no such entity, the belief is false.

Facts, for the neo-classical correspondence theory, are entities in their own right. Facts are generally taken to be composed of particulars and properties and relations or universals, at least. The neo-classical correspondence theory thus only makes sense within the setting of a metaphysics that includes such facts. Hence, it is no accident that as Moore and Russell turn away from the identity theory of truth, the metaphysics of facts takes on a much more significant role in their views. This perhaps becomes most vivid in the later Russell (1956, p. 182), where the existence of facts is the “first truism.” (The influence of Wittgenstein's ideas to appear in the Tractatus (1922) on Russell in this period was strong.)

Consider, for example, the belief that Ramey sings. Let us grant that this belief is true. In what does its truth consist, according to the correspondence theory? It consists in there being a fact in the world, built from the individual Ramey, and the property of singing. Let us denote this < Ramey , Singing >. This fact exists. In contrast, the world (we presume) contains no fact < Ramey , Dancing >. The belief that Ramey sings stands in the relation of correspondence to the fact < Ramey , Singing >, and so the belief is true.

What is the relation of correspondence? One of the standing objections to the classical correspondence theory is that a fully adequate explanation of correspondence proves elusive. But for a simple belief, like that Ramey sings, we can observe that the structure of the fact < Ramey , Singing > matches the subject-predicate form of the that -clause which reports the belief, and may well match the structure of the belief itself.

So far, we have very much the kind of view that Moore and Russell would have found congenial. But the modern form of the correspondence theory seeks to round out the explanation of correspondence by appeal to propositions . Indeed, it is common to base a correspondence theory of truth upon the notion of a structured proposition . Propositions are again cast at the contents of beliefs and assertions, and propositions have structure which at least roughly corresponds to the structure of sentences. At least, for simple beliefs like that Ramey sings, the proposition has the same subject predicate structure as the sentence. (Proponents of structured propositions, such as Kaplan (1989), often look to Russell (1903) for inspiration, and find unconvincing Russell's reasons for rejecting them.)

With facts and structured propositions in hand, an attempt may be made to explain the relation of correspondence. Correspondence holds between a proposition and a fact when the proposition and fact have the same structure, and the same constituents at each structural position. When they correspond, the proposition and fact thus mirror each-other. In our simple example, we might have:

proposition that Ramey sings ↓ ↓ fact < Ramey , Singing >

Propositions, though structured like facts, can be true or false. In a false case, like the proposition that Ramey dances, we would find no fact at the bottom of the corresponding diagram. Beliefs are true or false depending on whether the propositions which are believed are.

We have sketched this view for simple propositions like the proposition that Ramey sings. How to extend it to more complex cases, like general propositions or negative propositions, is an issue we will not delve into here. It requires deciding whether there are complex facts, such as general facts or negative facts, or whether there is a more complex relation of correspondence between complex propositions and simple facts. (The issue of whether there are such complex facts marks a break between Russell (1956) and Wittgenstein (1922) and the earlier views which Moore (1953) and Russell (1912) sketch.)

According to the correspondence theory as sketched here, what is key to truth is a relation between propositions and the world, which obtains when the world contains a fact that is structurally similar to the proposition. Though this is not the theory Moore and Russell held, it weaves together ideas of theirs with a more modern take on (structured) propositions. We will thus dub it the neo-classical correspondence theory. This theory offers us a paradigm example of a correspondence theory of truth.

The leading idea of the correspondence theory is familiar. It is a form of the older idea that true beliefs show the right kind of resemblance to what is believed. In contrast to earlier empiricist theories, the thesis is not that one's ideas per se resemble what they are about. Rather, the propositions which give the contents of one's true beliefs mirror reality, in virtue of entering into correspondence relations to the right pieces of it.

In this theory, it is the way the world provides us with appropriately structured entities that explains truth. Our metaphysics thus explains the nature of truth, by providing the entities needed to enter into correspondence relations.

For more on the correspondence theory, see the entry on the correspondance theory of truth .

Though initially the correspondence theory was seen by its developers as a competitor to the identity theory of truth, it was also understood as opposed to the coherence theory of truth.

We will be much briefer with the historical origins of the coherence theory than we were with the correspondence theory. Like the correspondence theory, versions of the coherence theory can be seen throughout the history of philosophy. (See, for instance, Walker (1989) for a discussion of its early modern lineage.) Like the correspondence theory, it was important in the early 20th century British origins of analytic philosophy. Particularly, the coherence theory of truth is associated with the British idealists to whom Moore and Russell were reacting.

Many idealists at that time did indeed hold coherence theories. Let us take as an example Joachim (1906). (This is the theory that Russell (1910a) attacks.) Joachim says that:

Truth in its essential nature is that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole (p. 76).

We will not attempt a full exposition of Joachim's view, which would take us well beyond the discussion of truth into the details of British idealism. But a few remarks about his theory will help to give substance to the quoted passage.

Perhaps most importantly, Joachim talks of ‘truth’ in the singular. This is not merely a turn of phrase, but a reflection of his monistic idealism. Joachim insists that what is true is the “whole complete truth” (p. 90). Individual judgments or beliefs are certainly not the whole complete truth. Such judgments are, according to Joachim, only true to a degree. One aspect of this doctrine is a kind of holism about content, which holds that any individual belief or judgment gets its content only in virtue of being part of a system of judgments. But even these systems are only true to a degree, measuring the extent to which they express the content of the single ‘whole complete truth’. Any real judgment we might make will only be partially true.

To flesh out Joachim's theory, we would have to explain what a significant whole is. We will not attempt that, as it leads us to some of the more formidable aspects of his view, e.g., that it is a “process of self-fulfillment” (p. 77). But it is clear that Joachim takes ‘systematic coherence’ to be stronger than consistency. In keeping with his holism about content, he rejects the idea that coherence is a relation between independently identified contents, and so finds it necessary to appeal to ‘significant wholes’.

As with the correspondence theory, it will be useful to recast the coherence theory in a more modern form, which will abstract away from some of the difficult features of British idealism. As with the correspondence theory, it can be put in a slogan:

A belief is true if and only if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs.

To further the contrast with the neo-classical correspondence theory, we may add that a proposition is true if it is the content of a belief in the system, or entailed by a belief in the system. We may assume, with Joachim, that the condition of coherence will be stronger than consistency. With the idealists generally, we might suppose that features of the believing subject will come into play.

This theory is offered as an analysis of the nature of truth, and not simply a test or criterion for truth. Put as such, it is clearly not Joachim's theory (it lacks his monism, and he rejects propositions), but it is a standard take on coherence in the contemporary literature. (It is the way the coherence theory is given in Walker (1989), for instance.) Let us take this as our neo-classical version of the coherence theory. The contrast with the correspondence theory of truth is clear. Far from being a matter of whether the world provides a suitable object to mirror a proposition, truth is a matter of how beliefs are related to each-other.

The coherence theory of truth enjoys two sorts of motivations. One is primarily epistemological. Most coherence theorists also hold a coherence theory of knowledge; more specifically, a coherence theory of justification. According to this theory, to be justified is to be part of a coherent system of beliefs. An argument for this is often based on the claim that only another belief could stand in a justification relation to a belief, allowing nothing but properties of systems of belief, including coherence, to be conditions for justification. Combining this with the thesis that a fully justified belief is true forms an argument for the coherence theory of truth. (An argument along these lines is found in Blanshard (1939), who holds a form of the coherence theory closely related to Joachim's.)

The steps in this argument may be questioned by a number of contemporary epistemological views. But the coherence theory also goes hand-in-hand with its own metaphysics as well. The coherence theory is typically associated with idealism. As we have already discussed, forms of it were held by British idealists such as Joachim, and later by Blanshard (in America). An idealist should see the last step in the justification argument as quite natural. More generally, an idealist will see little (if any) room between a system of beliefs and the world it is about, leaving the coherence theory of truth as an extremely natural option.

It is possible to be an idealist without adopting a coherence theory. (For instance, many scholars read Bradley as holding a version of the identity theory of truth. See Baldwin (1991) for some discussion.) However, it is hard to see much of a way to hold the coherence theory of truth without maintaining some form of idealism. If there is nothing to truth beyond what is to be found in an appropriate system of beliefs, then it would seem one's beliefs constitute the world in a way that amounts to idealism. (Walker (1989) argues that every coherence theorist must be an idealist, but not vice-versa.)

The neo-classical correspondence theory seeks to capture the intuition that truth is a content-to-world relation. It captures this in the most straightforward way, by asking for an object in the world to pair up with a true proposition. The neo-classical coherence theory, in contrast, insists that truth is not a content-to-world relation at all; rather, it is a content-to-content, or belief-to-belief, relation. The coherence theory requires some metaphysics which can make the world somehow reflect this, and idealism appears to be it. (A distant descendant of the neo-classical coherence theory that does not require idealism will be discussed in section 6.5 below.)

For more on the coherence theory, see the entry on the coherence theory of truth .

A different perspective on truth was offered by the American pragmatists. As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theories, the pragmatist theories go with some typical slogans. For example, Peirce is usually understood as holding the view that:

Truth is the end of inquiry.

(See, for instance Hartshorne et al., 1931-58, §3.432.) Both Peirce and James are associated with the slogan that:

Truth is satisfactory to believe.

James (e.g., 1907) understands this principle as telling us what practical value truth has. True beliefs are guaranteed not to conflict with subsequent experience. Likewise, Peirce's slogan tells us that true beliefs will remain settled at the end of prolonged inquiry. Peirce's slogan is perhaps most typically associated with pragmatist views of truth, so we might take it to be our canonical neo-classical theory. However, the contemporary literature does not seem to have firmly settled upon a received ‘neo-classical’ pragmatist theory.

In her reconstruction (upon which we have relied heavily), Haack (1976) notes that the pragmatists' views on truth also make room for the idea that truth involves a kind of correspondence, insofar as the scientific method of inquiry is answerable to some independent world. Peirce, for instance, does not reject a correspondence theory outright; rather, he complains that it provides merely a ‘nominal’ or ‘transcendental’ definition of truth (e.g Hartshorne et al., 1931-58, §5.553, 5.572), which is cut off from practical matters of experience, belief, and doubt (§5.416). (See Misak (1991) for an extended discussion.)

This marks an important difference between the pragmatist theories and the coherence theory we just considered. Even so, pragmatist theories also have an affinity with coherence theories, insofar as we expect the end of inquiry to be a coherent system of beliefs. As Haack also notes, James maintains an important verificationist idea: truth is what is verifiable. We will see this idea re-appear in section 4.

James' views are discussed further in the entry on William James . Peirce's views are discussed further in the entry on Charles Sanders Peirce .

2. Tarski's theory of truth

Modern forms of the classical theories survive. Many of these modern theories, notably correspondence theories, draw on ideas developed by Tarski.

In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that his seminal work on truth (1935) is very much of a piece with other works in mathematical logic, such as his (1931), and as much as anything this work lays the ground-work for the modern subject of model theory—a branch of mathematical logic, not the metaphysics of truth. In this respect, Tarski's work provides a set of highly useful tools that may be employed in a wide range of philosophical projects.

Tarski's work has a number of components, which we will consider in turn.

In the classical debate on truth at the beginning of the 20th century we considered in section 1, the issue of truth-bearers was of great significance. For instance, Moore and Russell's turn to the correspondence theory was driven by their views on whether there are propositions to be the bearers of truth. Many theories we reviewed took beliefs to be the bearers of truth.

In contrast, Tarski and much of the subsequent work on truth takes sentences to be the primary bearers of truth. This is not an entirely novel development: Russell (1956) also takes truth to apply to sentence (which he calls ‘propositions’ in that text). But whereas much of the classical debate takes the issue of the primary bearers of truth to be a substantial and important metaphysical one, Tarski is quite casual about it. His primary reason for taking sentences as truth-bearers is convenience, and he explicitly distances himself from any commitment about the philosophically contentious issues surrounding other candidate truth-bearers (e.g., Tarski, 1944). (Russell (1956) makes a similar suggestion that sentences are the appropriate truth-bearers “for the purposes of logic” (p. 184), though he still takes the classical metaphysical issues to be important.)

We will return to the issue of the primary bearers of truth in section 6.1. For the moment, it will be useful to simply follow Tarski's lead. But it should be stressed that for this discussion, sentences are fully interpreted sentences, having meanings. We will also assume that the sentences in question do not change their content across occasions of use, i.e., that they display no context-dependence. We are taking sentences to be what Quine (1960) calls ‘eternal sentences’.

In some places (e.g., Tarski, 1944), Tarski refers to his view as the ‘semantic conception of truth’. It is not entirely clear just what Tarski had in mind by this, but it is clear enough that Tarski's theory defines truth for sentences in terms of concepts like reference and satisfaction, which are intimately related to the basic semantic functions of names and predicates (according to many approaches to semantics).

Let us suppose we have a fixed language L whose sentences are fully interpreted. The basic question Tarski poses is what an adequate theory of truth for L would be. Tarski's answer is embodied in what he calls Convention T :

An adequate theory of truth for L must imply, for each sentence φ of L

⌈ φ ⌉  is true if and only if φ .

(We have simplified Tarski's presentation somewhat.) This is an adequacy condition for theories, not a theory itself. Given the assumption that L is fully interpreted, we may assume that each sentence φ in fact has a truth value. In light of this, Convention T guarantees that the truth predicate given by the theory will be extensionally correct , i.e., have as its extension all and only the true sentences of L .

Convention T draws our attention to the biconditionals of the form

⌈   ⌈ φ ⌉ is true if and only if φ ⌉ ,

which are usually called the Tarski biconditionals for a language L .

Tarski does not merely propose a condition of adequacy for theories of truth, he also shows how to meet it. One of his insights is that if the language L displays the right structure, then truth for L can be defined recursively. For instance, let us suppose that L is a simple formal language, containing two atomic sentences ‘snow is white’ and ‘grass is green’, and the sentential connectives ∨ and ¬.

In spite of its simplicity, L contains infinitely many distinct sentences. But truth can be defined for all of them by recursion.

• ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.
• ‘Grass is green’ is true if and only if grass is green.
• ⌈ φ ∨ ψ ⌉ is true if and only if ⌈ φ ⌉ is true or ⌈ ψ ⌉ is true.
• ⌈ ¬φ ⌉ is true if and only if it is not the case that ⌈ φ ⌉ is true.

This theory satisfies Convention T.

This may look trivial, but in defining an extensionally correct truth predicate for an infinite language with four clauses, we have made a modest application of a very powerful technique.

Tarski's techniques go further, however. They do not stop with atomic sentences. Tarski notes that truth for each atomic sentence can be defined in terms of two closely related notions: reference and satisfaction . Let us consider a language L ′ , just like L except that instead of simply having two atomic sentences, L ′ breaks atomic sentences into terms and predicates. L ′ contains terms ‘snow’ and ‘grass’ (let us engage in the idealization that these are simply singular terms), and predicates ‘is white’ and ‘is green’. So L ′ is like L , but also contains the sentences ‘Snow is green’ and ‘Grass is white’.)

We can define truth for atomic sentences of L ′ in the following way.

• ‘Snow’ refers to snow.
• ‘Grass’ refers to grass.
• a satisfies ‘is white’ if and only if a is white.
• a satisfies ‘is green’ if and only if a is green.
• For any atomic sentence ⌈ t is P ⌉ : ⌈ t is P ⌉ is true if and only if the referent of ⌈ t ⌉ satisfies ⌈ P ⌉ .

One of Tarski's key insights is that the apparatus of satisfaction allows for a recursive definition of truth for sentences with quantifiers , though we will not examine that here. We could repeat the recursion clauses for L to produce a full theory of truth for L ′.

Let us say that a Tarskian theory of truth is a recursive theory, built up in ways similar to the theory of truth for L ′. Tarski goes on to demonstrate some key applications of such a theory of truth. A Tarskian theory of truth for a language L can be used to show that theories in L are consistent. This was especially important to Tarski, who was concerned the Liar paradox would make theories in languages containing a truth predicate inconsistent.

For more, see the entry on Tarski's truth definitions .

3. Correspondence revisited

The correspondence theory of truth expresses the very natural idea that truth is a content-to-world or word-to-world relation: what we say or think is true or false in virtue of the way the world turns out to be. We suggested that, against a background like the metaphysics of facts, it does so in a straightforward way. But the idea of correspondence is certainly not specific to this framework. Indeed, it is controversial whether a correspondence theory should rely on any particular metaphysics at all. The basic idea of correspondence, as Tarski (1944) and others have suggested, is captured in the slogan from Aristotle's Metaphysics Γ 7.27, “to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true” (Ross, 1928). ‘What is’, it is natural enough to say, is a fact, but this natural turn of phrase may well not require a full-blown metaphysics of facts.

Yet without the metaphysics of facts, the notion of correspondence as discussed in section 1.1 loses substance. This has led to two distinct strands in contemporary thinking about the correspondence theory. One strand seeks to recast the correspondence theory in a way that does not rely on any particular ontology. Another seeks to find an appropriate ontology for correspondence, either in terms of facts or other entities. We will consider each in turn.

Tarski himself sometimes suggested that his theory was a kind of correspondence theory of truth. Whether his own theory is a correspondence theory, and even whether it provides any substantial philosophical account of truth at all, is a matter of controversy. (One rather drastic negative assessment from Putnam (1985-86, p. 333) is that “As a philosophical account of truth, Tarski's theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.”) But a number of philosophers (e.g., Davidson, 1969; Field, 1972) have seen Tarski's theory as providing at least the core of a correspondence theory of truth which dispenses with the metaphysics of facts.

Tarski's theory shows how truth for a sentence is determined by certain properties of its constituents; in particular, by properties of reference and satisfaction (as well as by the logical constants). As it is normally understood, reference is the preeminent word-to-world relation. Satisfaction is naturally understood as a word-to-world relation as well, which relates a predicate to the things in the world that bear it. The Tarskian recursive definition shows how truth is determined by reference and satisfaction, and so is in effect determined by the things in the world we refer to and the properties they bear. This, one might propose, is all the correspondence we need. It is not correspondence of sentences or propositions to facts; rather, it is correspondence of our expressions to objects and the properties they bear, and then ways of working out the truth of claims in terms of this.

This is certainly not the neo-classical idea of correspondence. In not positing facts, it does not posit any single object to which a true proposition or sentence might correspond. Rather, it shows how truth might be worked out from basic word-to-world relations. However, a number of authors have noted that Tarski's theory cannot by itself provide us with such an account of truth. As we will discuss more fully in section 4.2, Tarski's apparatus is in fact compatible with theories of truth that are certainly not correspondence theories.

Field (1972), in an influential discussion and diagnosis of what is lacking in Tarski's account, in effect points out that whether we really have something worthy of the name ‘correspondence’ depends on our having notions of reference and satisfaction which genuinely establish word-to-world relations. (Field does not use the term ‘correspondence’, but does talk about e.g., the “connection between words and things” (p. 373).) By itself, Field notes, Tarski's theory does not offer an account of reference and satisfaction at all. Rather, it offers a number of disquotation clauses , such as:

These clauses have an air of triviality (though whether they are to be understood as trivial principles or statements of non-trivial semantic facts has been a matter of some debate). With Field, we might propose to supplement clauses like these with an account of reference and satisfaction. Such a theory should tell us what makes it the case that the word ‘snow’ refer to snow. (In 1972, Field was envisaging a physicalist account, along the lines of the causal theory of reference.) This should inter alia guarantee that truth is really determined by word-to-world relations, so in conjunction with the Tarskian recursive definition, it could provide a correspondence theory of truth.

Such a theory clearly does not rely on a metaphysics of facts. Indeed, it is in many ways metaphysically neutral, as it does not take a stand on the nature of particulars, or of the properties or universals that underwrite facts about satisfaction. However, it may not be entirely devoid of metaphysical implications, as we will discuss further in section 4.1.

There have been a number of correspondence theories that do make use of facts. Some are notably different from the neo-classical theory sketched in section 1.1. For instance, Austin (1950) proposes a view in which each statement (understood roughly as an utterance event) corresponds to both a fact or situation, and a type of situation. It is true if the former is of the latter type. This theory (which has been developed by situation theory (e.g., Barwise and Perry, 1986) rejects the idea that correspondence is a kind of mirroring between a fact and a proposition. Rather, correspondence relations to Austin are entirely conventional. As an ordinary language philosopher, Austin grounds his notion of fact more in linguistic usage than in an articulated metaphysics, but he defends his use of fact-talk in Austin (1961b).

In a somewhat more Tarskian spirit, formal theories of facts or states of affairs have also been developed. For instance, Taylor (1976) provides a recursive definition of a collection of ‘states of affairs’ for a given language. Taylor's states of affairs seem to reflect the notion of fact at work in the neo-classical theory, though as an exercise in logic, they are officially n -tuples of objects and intensions .

There are more metaphysically robust notions of fact in the current literature. For instance, Armstrong (1997) defends a metaphysics in which facts (under the name ‘states of affairs’) are metaphysically fundamental. The view has much in common with the neo-classical one. Like the neo-classical view, Armstrong endorses a version of the correspondence theory. States of affairs are truthmakers for propositions, though Armstrong argues that there may be many such truthmakers for a given proposition, and vice versa. (Armstrong also envisages a naturalistic account of propositions as classes of equivalent belief-tokens.)

Armstrong's primary argument is what he calls the ‘truthmaker argument’. It begins by advancing a truthmaker principle , which holds that for any given truth, there must be a truthmaker—a “something in the world which makes it the case, that serves as an ontological ground, for this truth” (p. 115). It is then argued that facts are the appropriate truthmakers.

In contrast to the approach to correspondence discussed in section 3.1, which offered correspondence with minimal ontological implications, this view returns to the ontological basis of correspondence that was characteristic of the neo-classical theory.

The truthmaker principle is often put as the schema:

If φ , then there is an x such that necessarily, if x exists, then φ .

(Fox (1987) proposed putting the principle this way, rather than explicitly in terms of truth.)

The truthmaker principle expresses the ontological aspect of the neo-classical correspondence theory. Not merely must truth obtain in virtue of word-to-world relations, but there must be a thing that makes each truth true.

The neo-classical correspondence theory, and Armstrong, cast facts as the appropriate truthmakers. However, it is a non-trivial step from the truthmaker principle to the existence of facts. There are a number of proposals in the literature for how other sorts of objects could be truthmakers; for instance, tropes (called ‘moments’, in Mulligan et al., 1984). Parsons (1999) argues that the truthmaker principle (presented in a somewhat different form) is compatible with there being only concrete particulars.

As we saw in discussing the neo-classical correspondence theory, truthmaker theories, and fact theories in particular, raise a number of issues. One which has been discussed at length, for instance, is whether there are negative facts . Negative facts would be the truthmakers for negated sentences. Russell (1956) notoriously expresses ambivalence about whether there are negative facts. Armstrong (1997) rejects them, while Beall (2000) defends them.

4. Realism and anti-realism

The neo-classical theories we surveyed in section 1 made the theory of truth an application of their background metaphysics (and in some cases epistemology). In section 2 and especially in section 3, we returned to the issue of what sorts of ontological commitments might go with the theory of truth. There we saw a range of options, from relatively ontologically non-committal theories, to theories requiring highly specific ontologies.

There is another way in which truth relates to metaphysics. Many ideas about realism and anti-realism are closely related to ideas about truth. Indeed, many approaches to questions about realism and anti-realism simply make them questions about truth.

In discussing the approach to correspondence of section 3.1, we noted that it has few ontological requirements. It relies on there being objects of reference, and something about the world which makes for determinate satisfaction relations; but beyond that, it is ontologically neutral. But as we mentioned there, this is not to say that it has no metaphysical implications. A correspondence theory of truth, of any kind, is often taken to embody a form of realism .

The key features of realism, as we will take it, are that:

• The world exists objectively, independently of the ways we think about it or describe it.
• Our thoughts and claims are about that world.

(Wright (1992) offers a nice statement of this way of thinking about realism.) These theses imply that our claims are objectively true or false, depending on how the world they are about is. The world that we represent in our thoughts or language is an objective world. (Realism may be restricted to some subject-matter, or range of discourse, but for simplicity, we will talk about only its global form.)

It is often argued that these theses require some form of the correspondence theory of truth. (Putnam (1978, p. 18) notes, “Whatever else realists say, they typically say that they believe in a ‘correspondence theory of truth’.”) At least, they are supported by the kind of correspondence theory without facts discussed in section 3.1, such as Field's proposal. Such a theory will provide an account of objective relations of reference and satisfaction, and show how these determine the truth or falsehood of what we say about the world. Field's own approach (1972) to this problem seeks a physicalist explanation of reference. But realism is a more general idea than physicalism. Any theory that provides objective relations of reference and satisfaction, and builds up a theory of truth from them, would give a form of realism. (Making the objectivity of reference the key to realism is characteristic of work of Putnam, e.g., 1978.)

Another important mark of realism expressed in terms of truth is the property of bivalence . As Dummett has stressed (e.g., 1959; 1976; 1983; 1991), a realist should see there being a fact of the matter one way or the other about whether any given claim is correct. Hence, one important mark of realism is that it goes together with the principle of bivalence : every truth-bearer (sentence or proposition) is true or false. In much of his work, Dummett has made this the characteristic mark of realism, and often identifies realism about some subject-matter with accepting bivalence for discourse about that subject-matter. At the very least, it captures a great deal of what is more loosely put in the statement of realism above.

Either the approach makes the theory of truth—or truth-and-reference—the primary vehicle for an account of realism. A theory of truth which substantiates bivalence, or a determinate reference relation, does most of the work of giving a realistic metaphysics. It might even simply be a realistic metaphysics.

We have thus turned on its head the relation of truth to metaphysics we saw in our discussion of the neo-classical correspondence theory in section 1.1. There, a correspondence theory of truth was built upon a substantial metaphysics. Here, we have seen how articulating a theory that captures the idea of correspondence can be crucial to providing a realist metaphysics. (For another perspective on realism and truth, see Alston (1996). Devitt (1984) offers an opposing view to the kind we have sketched here, which rejects any characterization of realism in terms of truth or other semantic concepts.)

In light of our discussion in section 1.1.1, we should pause to note that the connection between realism and the correspondence theory of truth is not absolute. When Moore and Russell held the identity theory of truth, they were most certainly realists. The right kind of metaphysics of propositions can support a realist view, as can a metaphysics of facts. The modern form of realism we have been discussing here seeks to avoid basing itself on such particular ontological commitments, and so prefers to rely on the kind of correspondence-without-facts approach discussed in section 3.1. This is not to say that realism will be devoid of ontological commitments, but the commitments will flow from whichever specific claims about some subject-matter are taken to be true.

For more on realism and truth, see the entry on realism .

It should come as no surprise that the relation between truth and metaphysics seen by modern realists can also be exploited by anti-realists. Many modern anti-realists see the theory of truth as the key to formulating and defending their views. With Dummett (e.g., 1959; 1976; 1991), we might expect the characteristic mark of anti-realism to be the rejection of bivalence.

Indeed, many contemporary forms of anti-realism may be formulated as theories of truth, and they do typically deny bivalence. Anti-realism comes in many forms, but let us take as an example a (somewhat crude) form of verificationism. Such a theory holds that a claim is correct just insofar as it is in principle verifiable , i.e., there is a verification procedure we could in principle carry out which would yield the answer that the claim in question was verified.

So understood, verificationism is a theory of truth. The claim is not that verification is the most important epistemic notion, but that truth just is verifiability. As with the kind of realism we considered in section 4.1, this view expresses its metaphysical commitments in its explanation of the nature of truth. Truth is not, to this view, a fully objective matter, independent of us or our thoughts. Instead, truth is constrained by our abilities to verify, and is thus constrained by our epistemic situation. Truth is to a significant degree an epistemic matter, which is typical of many anti-realist positions.

As Dummett says, the verificationist notion of truth does not appear to support bivalence. Any statement that reaches beyond what we can in principle verify or refute (verify its negation) will be a counter-example to bivalence. Take, for instance, the claim that there is some substance, say uranium, present in some region of the universe too distant to be inspected by us within the expected lifespan of the universe. Insofar as this really would be in principle unverifiable, we have no reason to maintain it is true or false according to the verificationist theory of truth.

Verificationism of this sort is one of a family of anti-realist views. Another example is the view that identifies truth with warranted assertibility. Assertibility, as well as verifiability, has been important in Dummett's work. (See also works of McDowell, e.g., 1976 and Wright, e.g., 1976; 1982; 1992.)

Anti-realism of the Dummettian sort is not a descendant of the coherence theory of truth per se . But in some ways, as Dummett himself has noted, it might be construed as a descendant—perhaps very distant—of idealism. If idealism is the most drastic form of rejection of the independence of mind and world, Dummettian anti-realism is a more modest form, which sees epistemology imprinted in the world, rather than the wholesale embedding of world into mind. At the same time, the idea of truth as warranted assertibility or verifiability reiterates a theme from the pragmatist views of truth we surveyed in section 1.3.

Anti-realist theories of truth, like the realist ones we discussed in section 4.1, can generally make use of the Tarskian apparatus. Convention T, in particular, does not discriminate between realist and anti-realist notions of truth. Likewise, the base clauses of a Tarskian recursive theory are given as disquotation principles, which are neutral between realist and anti-realist understandings of notions like reference. As we saw with the correspondence theory, giving a full account of the nature of truth will generally require more than the Tarskian apparatus itself. How an anti-realist is to explain the basic concepts that go into a Tarskian theory is a delicate matter. As Dummett and Wright have investigated in great detail, it appears that the background logic in which the theory is developed will have to be non-classical.

For more on anti-realism and truth, see the entry on realism .

Many commentators see a close connection between Dummett's anti-realism and the pragmatists' views of truth, in that both put great weight on ideas of verifiability or assertibility. Dummett himself stressed parallels between anti-realism and intuitionism in the philosophy of mathematics.

Another view on truth which returns to pragmatist themes is the ‘internal realism’ of Putnam (1981). There Putnam glosses truth as what would be justified under ideal epistemic conditions. With the pragmatists, Putnam sees the ideal conditions as something which can be approximated, echoing the idea of truth as the end of inquiry.

Putnam is cautious about calling his view ant-realism, preferring the label ‘internal realism’. But he is clear that he sees his view as opposed to realism (‘metaphysical realism’, as he calls it).

5. Deflationism

We began in section 1 with the neo-classical theories, which explained the nature of truth within wider metaphysical systems. We then considered some alternatives in sections 2 and 3, some of which had more modest ontological implications. But we still saw in section 4 that substantial theories of truth tend to imply metaphysical theses, or even embody metaphysical positions.

One long-standing trend in the discussion of truth is to insist that truth really does not carry metaphysical significance at all. It does not, as it has no significance on its own. A number of different ideas have been advanced along these lines, under the general heading of deflationism .

Deflationist ideas appear quite early on, including a well-known argument against correspondence in Frege (1918-19). However, many deflationists take their cue from an idea of Ramsey (1927), often called the equivalence thesis :

⌈   ⌈ φ ⌉ is true ⌉ has the same meaning as φ.

(Ramsey himself takes truth-bearers to be propositions rather than sentences. Glanzberg (2003b) questions whether Ramsey's account of propositions really makes him a deflationist.)

This can be taken as the core of a theory of truth, often called the redundancy theory . The redundancy theory holds that there is no property of truth at all, and appearances of the expression ‘true’ in our sentences are redundant, having no effect on what we express.

The equivalence thesis can also be understood in terms of speech acts rather than meaning:

To assert that ⌈ φ ⌉ is true is just to assert that φ.

This view was advanced by Strawson (1949); Strawson (1950), though Strawson also argues that there are other important aspects of speech acts involving ‘true’ beyond what is asserted. For instance, they may be acts of confirming or granting what someone else said. (Strawson would also object to my making sentences the bearers of truth.)

In either its speech act or meaning form, the redundancy theory argues there is no property of truth. It is commonly noted that the equivalence thesis itself is not enough to sustain the redundancy theory. It merely holds that when truth occurs in the outermost position in a sentence, and the full sentence to which truth is predicated is quoted, then truth is eliminable. What happens in other environments is left to be seen. Modern developments of the redundancy theory include Grover et al. (1975).

The equivalence principle looks familiar: it has something like the form of the Tarski biconditionals discussed in section 2.2. However, it is a stronger principle, which identifies the two sides of the biconditional—either their meanings or the speech acts performed with them. The Tarski biconditionals themselves are simply material biconditionals.

A number of deflationary theories look to the Tarski biconditionals rather than the full equivalence principle. Their key idea is that even if we do not insist on redundancy, we may still hold the following theses:

• For a given language L and every φ in L , the biconditionals ⌈   ⌈ φ ⌉ is true if and only if φ ⌉ hold by definition (or analytically, or trivially, or by stipulation …).
• This is all there is to say about the concept of truth.

We will refer to views which adopt these as minimalist . Officially, this is the name of the view of Horwich (1990), but we will apply it somewhat more widely. (Horwich's view differs in some specific respects from what is presented here, such as predicating truth of propositions, but we believe it is close enough to what is sketched here to justify the name.)

The second thesis, that the Tarski biconditionals are all there is to say about truth, captures something similar to the redundancy theory's view. It comes near to saying that truth is not a property at all; to the extent that truth is a property, there is no more to it than the disquotational pattern of the Tarski biconditionals. As Horwich puts it, there is no substantial underlying metaphysics to truth. And as Soames (1984) stresses, certainly nothing that could ground as far-reaching a view as realism or anti-realism.

If there is no property of truth, or no substantial property of truth, what role does our term ‘true’ play? Deflationists typically note that the truth predicate provides us with a convenient device of disquotation . Such a device allows us to make some useful claims which we could not formulate otherwise, such as the blind ascription ‘The next thing that Bill says will be true’. (For more on blind ascriptions and their relation to deflationism, see Azzouni, 2001.) A predicate obeying the Tarski biconditionals can also be used to express what would otherwise be (potentially) infinite conjunctions or disjunctions, such as the notorious statement of Papal infallibility put ‘Everything the Pope says is true’. (Suggestions like this are found in Leeds, 1978 and Quine, 1970.)

Recognizing these uses for a truth predicate, we might simply think of it as introduced into a language by stipulation . The Tarski biconditionals themselves might be stipulated, as the minimalists envisage. One could also construe the clauses of a recursive Tarskian theory as stipulated. (There are some significant logical differences between these two options. See Halbach (1999) and Ketland (1999) for discussion.) Other deflationists, such as Beall (forthcoming) or Field (1994), might prefer to focus here on rules of inference or rules of use, rather than the Tarski biconditionals themselves.

There are also important connections between deflationist ideas about truth and certain ideas about meaning. These are fundamental to the deflationism of Field (1986); Field (1994), which will be discussed in section 6.3. For an insightful critique of deflationism, see Gupta (1993).

For more on deflationism, see the entry on the deflationary theory of truth .

6. Truth and language

One of the important themes in the literature on truth is its connection to meaning, or more generally, to language. This has proved an important application of ideas about truth, and an important issue in the study of truth itself. This section will consider a number of issues relating truth and language.

There have been many debates in the literature over what the primary bearers of truth are. Candidates typically include beliefs, propositions, sentences, and utterances. We have already seen in section 1 that the classical debates on truth took this issue very seriously, and what sort of theory of truth was viable was often seen to depend on what the bearers of truth are.

In spite of the number of options under discussion, and the significance that has sometimes been placed on the choice, there is an important similarity between candidate truth-bearers. Consider the role of truth-bearers in the correspondence theory, for instance. We have seen versions of it which take beliefs, propositions, or interpreted sentences to be the primary bearers of truth. But all of them rely upon the idea that their truth-bearers represent the world. It is in virtue of representing the world that truth-bearers are able to enter into correspondence relations. Truth-bearers are things which represent, and are true or false depending on whether they correctly represent the facts in the world.

Exactly the same point can be made for the anti-realist theories of truth we saw in section 4.2, though with different accounts of how truth-bearers represent, and what the world contributes. Though it is somewhat more delicate, something similar can be said for coherence theories, which usually take beliefs, or whole systems of beliefs, as the primary truth-bearers. Though a coherence theory will hardly talk of beliefs representing the facts, it is crucial to the coherence theory that beliefs are contentful beliefs of agents, and that they can enter into coherence relations. Noting the complications in interpreting the genuine classical coherence theories, it appears fair to note that this requires truth-bearers to be representations, however the background metaphysics (presumably idealism) understands representation.

Though Tarski works with sentences, the same can be said of his theory. The sentences to which Tarski's theory applies are fully interpreted, and so also are representations. They characterize the world as being some way or another, and this in turn determines whether they are true or false. Indeed, Tarski needs there to be a fact of the matter about whether each sentence is true or false (abstracting away from context dependence), to ensure that the Tarski biconditionals do their job of fixing the extension of ‘is true’. (But note that just what this fact of the matter consists in is left open by the Tarskian apparatus.)

We thus find the usual candidate truth-bearers linked in a tight circle: interpreted sentences, the propositions they express, the belief speakers might hold towards them, and the acts of assertion they might perform with them are all connected by providing representations. This makes them reasonable bearers of truth. For this reason, it seems, contemporary debates on truth have been much less concerned with the issue of truth-bearers than were the classical ones. Some issues remain, of course. Different metaphysical assumptions may place primary weight on some particular node in the circle, and some metaphysical views still challenge the existence of some of the nodes. Perhaps more importantly, different views on the nature of representation itself might cast doubt on the coherence of some of the nodes. Notoriously for instance, Quineans (e.g., Quine, 1960) deny the existence of intensional entities, including propositions. Even so, it increasingly appears doubtful that attention to truth per se will bias us towards one particular primary bearer of truth.

There is a related, but somewhat different point, which is important to understanding the theories we have canvassed.

The neo-classical theories of truth start with truth-bearers which are already understood to be representational, and explain how they get their truth values. But along the way, they often do something more. Take the neo-classical correspondence theory, for instance. This theory, in effect, starts with a view of how propositions represent the world. They do so by having constituents in the world, which are brought together in the right way. There are many complications about the nature of representation, but at a minimum, this tells us what the truth conditions associated with a proposition are. The theory then explains how such truth conditions can lead to the truth value true , by the right fact existing .

Many theories of truth are like the neo-classical correspondence theory in being as much theories of how truth-bearers represent as of how their truth values are fixed. Again, abstracting from some complications about representation, this makes them theories both of truth conditions and truth values . The Tarskian theory of truth can be construed this way too. This can be seen both in the way the Tarski biconditionals are understood, and how a recursive theory of truth is understood. As we explained Convention T in section 2.2, the primary role of a Tarski biconditional of the form ⌈   ⌈ φ ⌉ is true if and only if φ ⌉ is to fix whether φ is in the extension of ‘is true’ or not. But it can also be seen as stating the truth conditions of φ. Both rely on the fact that the unquoted occurrence of φ is an occurrence of an interpreted sentence, which has a truth value, but also provides its truth conditions upon occasions of use.

Likewise, the base clauses of the recursive definition of truth, those for reference and satisfaction, are taken to state the relevant semantic properties of constituents of an interpreted sentence. In discussing Tarski's theory of truth in section 2, we focused on how these determine the truth value of a sentence. But they also show us the truth conditions of a sentence are determined by these semantic properties. For instance, for a simple sentence like ‘Snow is white’, the theory tells us that the sentence is true if the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies ‘white’. This can be understood as telling us that the truth conditions of ‘Snow is white’ are those conditions in which the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies the predicate ‘is white’.

As we saw in sections 3 and 4, the Tarskian apparatus is often seen as needing some kind of supplementation to provide a full theory of truth. A full theory of truth conditions will likewise rest on how the Tarskian apparatus is put to use. In particular, just what kinds of conditions those in which the referent of ‘snow’ satisfies the predicate ‘is white’ are will depend on whether we opt for realist or anti-realist theories. The realist option will simply look for the conditions under which the stuff snow bears the property of whiteness; the anti-realist option will look to the conditions under which it can be verified, or asserted with warrant, that snow is white.

There is a broad family of theories of truth which are theories of truth conditions as well as truth values. This family includes the correspondence theory in all its forms—classical and modern. Yet this family is much wider than the correspondence theory, and wider than realist theories of truth more generally. Indeed, virtually all the theories of truth that make contributions to the realism/anti-realism debate are theories of truth conditions. In a slogan, for many approaches to truth, a theory of truth is a theory of truth conditions.

Any theory that provides a substantial account of truth conditions can offer a simple account of truth values: a truth-bearer provides truth conditions, and it is true if and only if the actual way things are is among them. Because of this, any such theory will imply a strong, but very particular, biconditional, close in form to the Tarski biconditionals. It can be made most vivid if we think of propositions as sets of truth conditions. Let p be a proposition, i.e., a set of truth conditions, and let a be the ‘actual world’, the condition that actually obtains. Then we can almost trivially see:

p  is true if and only if  a ∈ p .

This is presumably necessary. But it is important to observe that it is in one respect crucially different from the genuine Tarski biconditionals. It makes no use of a non-quoted sentence, or in fact any sentence at all. It does not have the disquotational character of the Tarski biconditionals.

Though this may look like a principle that deflationists should applaud, it is not. Rather, it shows that deflationists cannot really hold a truth-conditional view of content at all. If they do, then they inter alia have a non-deflationary theory of truth, simply by linking truth value to truth conditions through the above biconditional. It is typical of thoroughgoing deflationist theories to present a non-truth-conditional theory of the contents of sentences: a non-truth-conditional account of what makes truth-bearers representational. We take it this is what is offered, for instance, by the use theory of propositions in Horwich (1990). It is certainly one of the leading ideas of Field (1986); Field (1994), which explore how a conceptual role account of content would ground a deflationist view of truth. Once one has a non-truth-conditional account of content, it is then possible to add a deflationist truth predicate, and use this to give purely deflationist statements of truth conditions. But the starting point must be a non-truth-conditional view of what makes truth-bearers representational.

Both deflationists and anti-realists start with something other than correspondence truth conditions. But whereas an anti-realist will propose a different theory of truth conditions, a deflationists will start with an account of content which is not a theory of truth conditions at all. The deflationist will then propose that the truth predicate, given by the Tarski biconditionals, is an additional device, not for understanding content, but for disquotation. It is a useful device, as we discussed in section 5.3, but it has nothing to do with content. To a deflationist, the representational properties of truth-bearers have nothing to do with truth.

It has been an influential idea, since the seminal work of Davidson (e.g., 1967), to see a Tarskian theory of truth as a theory of meaning. At least, as we have seen, a Tarskian theory can be seen as showing how the truth conditions of a sentence are determined by the semantic properties of its parts. More generally, as we see in much of the work of Davidson and of Dummett (e.g., 1959; 1976; 1983; 1991), giving a theory of truth conditions can be understood as a crucial part of giving a theory of meaning. Thus, any theory of truth that falls into the broad category of those which are theories of truth conditions can be seen as part of a theory of meaning.

A number of commentators on Tarski (e.g., Etchemendy, 1988; Soames, 1984) have observed that the Tarskian apparatus needs to be understood in a particular way to make it suitable for giving a theory of meaning. Tarski's work is often taken to show how to define a truth predicate. If it is so used, then whether or not a sentence is true becomes, in essence, a truth of mathematics. Presumably what truth conditions sentences of a natural language have is a contingent matter, so a truth predicate defined in this way cannot be used to give a theory of meaning for them. But the Tarskian apparatus need not be used just to explicitly define truth. The recursive characterization of truth can be used to state the semantic properties of sentences and their constituents, as a theory of meaning should. In such an application, truth is not taken to be explicitly defined, but rather the truth conditions of sentences are taken to be described. (See Heck, 1997 for more discussion.)

Inspired by Quine (e.g., 1960), Davidson himself is well known for taking a different approach to using a theory of truth as a theory of meaning than is implicit in Field (1972). Whereas a Field-inspired approach is based on a causal account of reference, Davidson (e.g., 1973) proposes a process of radical interpretation in which an interpreter builds a Tarskian theory to interpret a speaker as holding beliefs which are consistent, coherent, and largely true.

This led Davidson (1986) to argue that most of our beliefs are true—a conclusion that squares well with the coherence theory of truth. This is a weaker claim than the neo-classical coherence theory would make. It does not insist that all the members of any coherent set of beliefs are true, or that truth simply consists in being a member of such a coherent set. But all the same, the conclusion that most of our beliefs are true, because their contents are to be understood through a process of radical interpretation which will make them a coherent and rational system, has a clear affinity with the neo-classical coherence theory.

At the same time, Davidson insists that this observation is compatible with a kind of correspondence theory of truth. Indeed, insofar as the Tarskian theory of truth provides a correspondence theory, radical interpretation builds a correspondence theory of truth into its account of content. As we have seen, whether or not this really amounts to a correspondence theory is disputed. As we saw in section 3.1, the Tarskian theory by itself is weaker than the kind of theory proposed by Field (1972); as we saw in section 4.2, it is compatible with anti-realist views of truth. Nonetheless, the Tarskian clauses themselves state more of about the relation of word-to-world than the neo-classical coherence theory anticipated, which leads Davidson to the conclusion that coherence results in correspondence.

For more on Davidson, see the entry on Donald Davidson .

The relation between truth and meaning is not the only place where truth and language relate closely. Another is the idea, also much-stressed in the writings of Dummett (e.g., 1959), of the relation between truth and assertion. Again, it fits into a platitude:

Truth is the aim of assertion.

A person making an assertion, the platitude holds, aims to say something true.

It is easy to cast this platitude in a way that appears false. Surely, many speakers do not aim to say something true. Any speaker who lies does not. Any speaker whose aim is to flatter, or to deceive, aims at something other than truth.

The motivation for the truth-assertion platitude is rather different. It looks at assertion as a practice, in which certain rules are constitutive . As is often noted, the natural parallel here is with games, like chess or baseball, which are defined by certain rules. The platitude holds that it is constitutive of the practice of making assertions that assertions aim at truth. An assertion by its nature presents what it is saying as true, and any assertion which fails to be true is ipso facto liable to criticism, whether or not the person making the assertion themself wished to have said something true or to have lied.

Dummett's original discussion of this idea was partially a criticism of deflationism (in particular, of views of Strawson, 1950). The idea that we fully explain the concept of truth by way of the Tarski biconditionals is challenged by the claim that the truth-assertion platitude is fundamental to truth. As Dummett there put it, what is left out by the Tarski biconditionals, and captured by the truth-assertion platitude, is the point of the concept of truth, or what the concept is used for. (For further discussion, see Glanzberg, 2003a and Wright, 1992.)

Whether or not assertion has such constitutive rules is, of course, controversial. But among those who accept that it does, the place of truth in the constitutive rules is itself controversial. The leading alternative, defended by Williamson (1996), is that knowledge, not truth, is fundamental to the constitutive rules of assertion. Williamson defends an account of assertion based on the rule that one must assert only what one knows.

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• Dummett, Michael, 1978, Truth and Other Enigmas , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Dummett, Michael, 1983, “Language and truth”, in Approaches to Language , Roy Harris, ed., Oxford: Pergamon, 95-125. Reprinted in Dummett (1993).
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• Dummett, Michael, 1993, The Seas of Language , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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• Field, Hartry, 1972, “Tarski's theory of truth”, Journal of Philosophy , 69: 347-375.
• Field, Hartry, 1986, “The deflationary conception of truth”, in Fact, Science and Value , C. Wright and G. MacDonald, eds., Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 55-117.
• Field, Hartry, 1994, “Deflationist views of meaning and content”, Mind , 103: 249-285.
• Fox, John, 1987, “Truthmaker”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 65: 188-207.
• Frege, Gottlob, 1918-19, “Der gedanke”, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus , 1: 58-77. Translated by P. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff as “Thoughts” in Frege (1984).
• Frege, Gottlob, 1984, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy , Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Edited by B. McGuiness.
• Glanzberg, Michael, 2003a, “Against truth-value gaps”, in Liars and Heaps , J. C. Beall, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 151-194.
• Glanzberg, Michael, 2003b, “Minimalism and paradoxes”, Synthese , 135: 13-36.
• Grover, Dorothy L., Kamp, Joseph L., and Belnap, Nuel D., 1975, “A prosentential theory of truth”, Philosophical Studies , 27: 73-125.
• Gupta, Anil, 1993, “A critique of deflationism”, Philosophical Topics , 21: 57-81.
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• Halbach, Volker, 1999, “Disquotationalism and infinite conjunctions”, Mind , 108: 1-22.
• Hartshorne, C., Weiss, P., and Burks, A. W. (eds.), 1931-58, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , vol. 1-8, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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• Hylton, Peter, 1990, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• James, William, 1907, “Pragmatism's conception of truth”, in Pragmatism , New York: Longmans, 197-236.
• Joachim, H. H., 1906, The Nature of Truth , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Kaplan, David, 1989, “Demonstratives”, in Themes From Kaplan , J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 481-563. First publication of a widely circulated manuscript dated 1977.
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• Lackey, Douglas (ed.), 1973, Essays in Analysis , New York: George Braziller.
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• Misak, Cheryl J., 1991, Truth and the End of Inquiry , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Moore, George Edward, 1899, “The nature of judgment”, Mind , 8: 176-193.
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• Moore, George Edward, 1953, Some Main Problems of Philosophy , London: George Allen and Unwin.
• Mulligan, Kevin, Simons, Peter, and Smith, Barry, 1984, “Truth-makers”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 44: 287-321.
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• Tarski, Alfred, 1935, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalizierten Sprachen”, Studia Philosophica , 1: 261-405. References are to the translation by J. H. Woodger as “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” in Tarski (1983).
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[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

Davidson, Donald | James, William | Peirce, Charles Sanders | realism | Tarski, Alfred: truth definitions | truth: axiomatic theories of | truth: coherence theory of | truth: correspondence theory of | truth: deflationary theory of | truth: identity theory of

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Josh Parsons for advice on metaphysics, and to JC Beall, Justin Khoo, Jason Stanley, and Paul Teller for very helpful comments on earlier drafts.

• Postmodernism

The pursuit of truth is often thought to be "intrinsically" valuable. Scientists and philosophers, who eschew religious rationales for their life's work, take the pursuit of truth to be obviously a worthwhile enterprise. But what's so great about truth? Sure, it's good to know what's for lunch, or the nature of the disease that plagues you, but is there any intrinsic or instrumental value in knowing how far away the farthest stars are? Or whether Milton's greatest works were written while he had a headache? Or what the next layer of basic particles are like? Truth telling on Philosophy Talk with Simon Blackburn, author of  Truth: A Guide.

Listening Notes

What's so valuable about truth? Ken thinks that the value of truth is obvious. Having true beliefs help us act so as to satisfy our desires. John points out that sometimes the truth can be harmful, such as knowing where drugs are being sold. There are a lot of truths that are irrelevant or trivial. There are also depressing truths. Ken thinks that you can't separate truth from believing because when we believe something, we take it to be true. Ken introduces the guest, Simon Blackburn, professor at Cambridge. John asks Blackburn to explain the nature of truth. Blackburn explains minimalism about truth, which says that there is no general answer about truth. The correspondence theory of truth says that there is some fact that makes a judgment true. However, there is no higher-order verification of this judgment. Another view is the pragmatist theory which says that the truth is valuable because it is useful.

What is the postmodernists' problem with truth? Blackburn says that the general idea goes back to Nietzsche and it is that our judgments and beliefs are formed and shaped by various forces beyond our control. Ken says that we would get around this if we had some method of tracking the truth. Blackburn says that the correspondence theory of truth works great when we are working with a straightforward representation of the world that we understand. How do we discern truth from falsehood? Blackburn thinks that is a skill that requires a lot of practice.

Some truths hurt us and some falsehoods are comforting. Should we always seek out truth for its own sake? There are a bunch of useless truths, such as the composition of dirt on Mars. Blackburn thinks that the useful falsehood is a hard idea to dispel. According to many psychologists, most people think they are about 15% smarter or good-looking than they actually are, and that keeps many people from being depressed. Nietzsche was moved to his relativism by perspectivism, which says that we view the world from our own perspective. Blackburn doesn't think that perspectivism leads to relativism because the visual metaphor breaks down.  

• Roving Philosophical Report  (Seek to 05:20): Polly Stryker asks several people whether we should always tell the truth.

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Related Blogs

Does truth matter, related resources.

Web Resources

• The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the correspondence theory of truth
• The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the deflationary theory of truth
• The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the revisionary theory of truth
• Laurence BonJour's essay "Truth and Correspondence"
• The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on truth
• The Wikipedia entry on truth
• An introductory website on truth
• An excerpt from Emile Durkheim's Pragmatism and the Question of Truth
• Simon Blackburn's Truth: A Guide
• Michael Lynch's Why Truth Matters
• The Oxford Readings in Philosophy series Truth
• Felipe Fernandez-Arnesto's Truth: A History and a Guide for the Perplexed
• Richard Kirkham's Theories of Truth
• Michael Lynch's Nature of Truth
• William Alston's A Realist Conception of Truth
• Michael Devitt's Realism and Truth
• Scott Soames's Understanding Truth
• Paul Horwich's Truth
• Simon Blackburn's Dictionary of Philosophy

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Democracy, Social Media, and Freedom of Expression: Hate, Lies, and the Search for the Possible Truth

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This Essay is a critical reflection on the impact of the digital revolution and the internet on three topics that shape the contemporary world: democracy, social media, and freedom of expression. Part I establishes historical and conceptual assumptions about constitutional democracy and discusses the role of digital platforms in the current moment of democratic recession. Part II discusses how, while social media platforms have revolutionized interpersonal and social communication and democratized access to knowledge and information, they also have led to an exponential spread of mis- and disinformation, hate speech, and conspiracy theories. Part III proposes a framework that balances regulation of digital platforms with the countervailing fundamental right to freedom of expression, a right that is essential for human dignity, the search for the possible truth, and democracy. Part IV highlights the role of society and the importance of media education in the creation of a free, but positive and constructive, environment on the internet.

I. Introduction

Before the internet, few actors could afford to participate in public debate due to the barriers that limited access to its enabling infrastructure, such as television channels and radio frequencies. 1 Digital platforms tore down this gate by creating open online communities for user-generated content, published without editorial control and at no cost. This exponentially increased participation in public discourse and the amount of information available. 2 At the same time, it led to an increase in disinformation campaigns, hate speech, slander, lies, and conspiracy theories used to advance antidemocratic goals. Platforms’ attempts to moderate speech at scale while maximizing engagement and profits have led to an increasingly prominent role for content moderation algorithms that shape who can participate and be heard in online public discourse. These systems play an essential role in the exercise of freedom of expression and in democratic competence and participation in the 21st century.

In this context, this Essay is a critical reflection on the impacts of the digital revolution and of the internet on democracy and freedom of expression. Part I establishes historical and conceptual assumptions about constitutional democracy; it also discusses the role of digital platforms in the current moment of democratic recession. Part II discusses how social media platforms are revolutionizing interpersonal and social communication, and democratizing access to knowledge and information, but also lead to an exponential spread of mis- and disinformation, hate speech and conspiracy theories. Part III proposes a framework for the regulation of digital platforms that seeks to find the right balance with the countervailing fundamental right to freedom of expression. Part IV highlights the role of society and the importance of media education in the creation of a free, but positive and constructive, environment on the internet.

II. Democracy and Authoritarian Populism

Constitutional democracy emerged as the predominant ideology of the 20th century, rising above the alternative projects of communism, fascism, Nazism, military regimes, and religious fundamentalism . 3 Democratic constitutionalism centers around two major ideas that merged at the end of the 20th century: constitutionalism , heir of the liberal revolutions in England, America, and France, expressing the ideas of limited power, rule of law, and respect for fundamental rights; 4 and democracy , a regime of popular sovereignty, free and fair elections, and majority rule. 5 In most countries, democracy only truly consolidated throughout the 20th century through universal suffrage guaranteed with the end of restrictions on political participation based on wealth, education, sex, or race. 6

Contemporary democracies are made up of votes, rights, and reasons. They are not limited to fair procedural rules in the electoral process, but demand respect for substantive fundamental rights of all citizens and a permanent public debate that informs and legitimizes political decisions. 7 To ensure protection of these three aspects, most democratic regimes include in their constitutional framework a supreme court or constitutional court with jurisdiction to arbitrate the inevitable tensions that arise between democracy’s popular sovereignty and constitutionalism’s fundamental rights. 8 These courts are, ultimately, the institutions responsible for protecting fundamental rights and the rules of the democratic game against any abuse of power attempted by the majority. Recent experiences in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Venezuela, and Nicaragua show that when courts fail to fulfill this role, democracy collapses or suffers major setbacks. 9

In recent years, several events have challenged the prevalence of democratic constitutionalism in many parts of the world, in a phenomenon characterized by many as democratic recession. 10 Even consolidated democracies have endured moments of turmoil and institutional discredit, 11 as the world witnessed the rise of an authoritarian, anti-pluralist, and anti-institutional populist wave posing serious threats to democracy.

Populism can be right-wing or left-wing, 12 but the recent wave has been characterized by the prevalence of right-wing extremism, often racist, xenophobic, misogynistic, and homophobic. 13 While in the past the far left was united through Communist International, today it is the far right that has a major global network. 14 The hallmark of right-wing populism is the division of society into “us” (the pure, decent, conservatives) and “them” (the corrupt, liberal, cosmopolitan elites). 15 Authoritarian populism flows from the unfulfilled promises of democracy for opportunities and prosperity for all. 16 Three aspects undergird this democratic frustration: political (people do not feel represented by the existing electoral systems, political leaders, and democratic institutions); social (stagnation, unemployment, and the rise of inequality); and cultural identity (a conservative reaction to the progressive identity agenda of human rights that prevailed in recent decades with the protection of the fundamental rights of women, African descendants, religious minorities, LGBTQ+ communities, indigenous populations, and the environment). 17

Extremist authoritarian populist regimes often adopt similar strategies to capitalize on the political, social, and cultural identity-based frustrations fueling democratic recessions. These tactics include by-pass or co-optation of the intermediary institutions that mediate the interface between the people and the government, such as the legislature, the press, and civil society. They also involve attacks on supreme courts and constitutional courts and attempts to capture them by appointing submissive judges. 18 The rise of social media potentializes these strategies by creating a free and instantaneous channel of direct communication between populists and their supporters. 19 This unmediated interaction facilitates the use of disinformation campaigns, hate speech, slander, lies, and conspiracy theories as political tools to advance antidemocratic goals. The instantaneous nature of these channels is ripe for impulsive reactions, which facilitate verbal attacks by supporters and polarization, feeding back into the populist discourse. These tactics threaten democracy and free and fair elections because they deceive voters and silence the opposition, distorting public debate. Ultimately, this form of communication undermines the values that justify the special protection of freedom of expression to begin with. The “truth decay” and “fact polarization” that result from these efforts discredit institutions and consequently foster distrust in democracy. 20

III. Internet, Social Media, and Freedom of Expression 21

The third industrial revolution, also known as the technological or digital revolution, has shaped our world today. 22 Some of its main features are the massification of personal computers, the universalization of smartphones and, most importantly, the internet. One of the main byproducts of the digital revolution and the internet was the emergence of social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok and messaging applications like WhatsApp and Telegram. We live in a world of apps, algorithms, artificial intelligence, and innovation occurring at breakneck speed where nothing seems truly new for very long. This is the background for the narrative that follows.

A. The Impact of the Internet

The internet revolutionized the world of interpersonal and social communication, exponentially expanded access to information and knowledge, and created a public sphere where anyone can express ideas, opinions, and disseminate facts. 23 Before the internet, one’s participation in public debate was dependent upon the professional press, 24 which investigated facts, abided by standards of journalistic ethics, 25 and was liable for damages if it knowingly or recklessly published untruthful information. 26 There was a baseline of editorial control and civil liability over the quality and veracity of what was published in this medium. This does not mean that it was a perfect world. The number of media outlets was, and continues to be, limited in quantity and perspectives; journalistic companies have their own interests, and not all of them distinguish fact from opinion with the necessary care. Still, there was some degree of control over what became public, and there were costs to the publication of overtly hateful or false speech.

The internet, with the emergence of websites, personal blogs, and social media, revolutionized this status quo. It created open, online communities for user-generated texts, images, videos, and links, published without editorial control and at no cost. This advanced participation in public discourse, diversified sources, and exponentially increased available information. 27 It gave a voice to minorities, civil society, politicians, public agents, and digital influencers, and it allowed demands for equality and democracy to acquire global dimensions. This represented a powerful contribution to political dynamism, resistance to authoritarianism, and stimulation of creativity, scientific knowledge, and commercial exchanges. 28 Increasingly, the most relevant political, social, and cultural communications take place on the internet’s unofficial channels.

However, the rise of social media also led to an increase in the dissemination of abusive and criminal speech. 29 While these platforms did not create mis- or disinformation, hate speech, or speech that attacks democracy, the ability to publish freely, with no editorial control and little to no accountability, increased the prevalence of these types of speech and facilitated its use as a political tool by populist leaders. 30 Additionally, and more fundamentally, platform business models compounded the problem through algorithms that moderate and distribute online content. 31

B. The Role of Algorithms

The ability to participate and be heard in online public discourse is currently defined by the content moderation algorithms of a couple major technology companies. Although digital platforms initially presented themselves as neutral media where users could publish freely, they in fact exercise legislative, executive, and judicial functions because they unilaterally define speech rules in their terms and conditions and their algorithms decide how content is distributed and how these rules are applied. 32

Specifically, digital platforms rely on algorithms for two different functions: recommending content and moderating content. 33 First, a fundamental aspect of the service they offer involves curating the content available to provide each user with a personalized experience and increase time spent online. They resort to deep learning algorithms that monitor every action on the platform, draw from user data, and predict what content will keep a specific user engaged and active based on their prior activity or that of similar users. 34 The transition from a world of information scarcity to a world of information abundance generated fierce competition for user attention—the most valuable resource in the Digital Age. 35 The power to modify a person’s information environment has a direct impact on their behavior and beliefs. Because AI systems can track an individual’s online history, they can tailor specific messages to maximize impact. More importantly, they monitor whether and how the user interacts with the tailored message, using this feedback to influence future content targeting and progressively becoming more effective in shaping behavior. 36 Given that humans engage more with content that is polarizing and provocative, these algorithms elicit powerful emotions, including anger. 37 The power to organize online content therefore directly impacts freedom of expression, pluralism, and democracy. 38

In addition to recommendation systems, platforms rely on algorithms for content moderation, the process of classifying content to determine whether it violates community standards. 39 As mentioned, the growth of social media and its use by people around the world allowed for the spread of lies and criminal acts with little cost and almost no accountability, threatening the stability of even long-standing democracies. Inevitably, digital platforms had to enforce terms and conditions defining the norms of their digital community and moderate speech accordingly. 40 But the potentially infinite amount of content published online means that this control cannot be exercised exclusively by humans.

Content moderation algorithms optimize the scanning of published content to identify violations of community standards or terms of service at scale and apply measures ranging from removal to reducing reach or including clarifications or references to alternative information. Platforms often rely on two algorithmic models for content moderation. The first is the reproduction detection model , which uses unique identifiers to catch reproductions of content previously labeled as undesired. 41 The second system, the predictive model , uses machine learning techniques to identify potential illegalities in new and unclassified content. 42 Machine learning is a subtype of artificial intelligence that extracts patterns in training datasets, capable of learning from data without explicit programming to do so. 43 Although helpful, both models have shortcomings.

The reproduction detection model is inefficient for content such as hate speech and disinformation, where the potential for new and different publications is virtually unlimited and users can deliberately make changes to avoid detection. 44 The predictive model is still limited in its ability to address situations to which it has not been exposed in training, primarily because it lacks the human ability to understand nuance and to factor in contextual considerations that influence the meaning of speech. 45 Additionally, machine learning algorithms rely on data collected from the real world and may embed prejudices or preconceptions, leading to asymmetrical applications of the filter. 46 And because the training data sets are so large, it can be hard to audit them for these biases. 47

Despite these limitations, algorithms will continue to be a crucial resource in content moderation given the scale of online activities. 48 In the last two months of 2020 alone, Facebook applied a content moderation measure to 105 million publications, and Instagram to 35 million. 49 YouTube has 500 hours of video uploaded per minute and removed more than 9.3 million videos. 50 In the first half of 2020, Twitter analyzed complaints related to 12.4 million accounts for potential violations of its rules and took action against 1.9 million. 51 This data supports the claim that human moderation is impossible, and that algorithms are a necessary tool to reduce the spread of illicit and harmful content. On the one hand, holding platforms accountable for occasional errors in these systems would create wrong incentives to abandon algorithms in content moderation with the negative consequence of significantly increasing the spread of undesired speech. 52 On the other hand, broad demands for platforms to implement algorithms to optimize content moderation, or laws that impose very short deadlines to respond to removal requests submitted by users, can create excessive pressure for the use of these imprecise systems on a larger scale. Acknowledging the limitations of this technology is fundamental for precise regulation.

C. Some Undesirable Consequences

One of the most striking impacts of this new informational environment is the exponential increase in the scale of social communications and the circulation of news. Around the world, few newspapers, print publications, and radio stations cross the threshold of having even one million subscribers and listeners. This suggests the majority of these publications have a much smaller audience, possibly in the thousands or tens of thousands of people. 53 Television reaches millions of viewers, although diluted among dozens or hundreds of channels. 54 Facebook, on the other hand, has about 3 billion active users. 55 YouTube has 2.5 billion accounts. 56 WhatsApp, more than 2 billion. 57 The numbers are bewildering. However, and as anticipated, just as the digital revolution democratized access to knowledge, information, and public space, it also introduced negative consequences for democracy that must be addressed. Three of them include:

a) the increased circulation of disinformation, deliberate lying, hate speech, conspiracy theories, attacks on democracy, and inauthentic behavior, made possible by recommendation algorithms that optimize for user engagement and content moderation algorithms that are still incapable of adequately identifying undesirable content;

b) the tribalization of life, with the formation of echo chambers where groups speak only to themselves, reinforcing confirmation bias, 58 making speech progressively more radical, and contributing to polarization and intolerance; and

c) a global crisis in the business model of the professional press. Although social media platforms have become one of the main sources of information, they do not produce their own content. They hire engineers, not reporters, and their interest is engagement, not news. 59 Because advertisers’ spending has migrated away from traditional news publications to technological platforms with broader reaches, the press has suffered from a lack of revenue which has forced hundreds of major publications, national and local, to close their doors or reduce their journalist workforce. 60 But a free and strong press is more than just a private business; it is a pillar for an open and free society. It serves a public interest in the dissemination of facts, news, opinions, and ideas, indispensable preconditions for the informed exercise of citizenship. Knowledge and truth—never absolute, but sincerely sought—are essential elements for the functioning of a constitutional democracy. Citizens need to share a minimum set of common objective facts from which to inform their own judgments. If they cannot accept the same facts, public debate becomes impossible. Intolerance and violence are byproducts of the inability to communicate—hence the importance of “knowledge institutions,” such as universities, research entities, and the institutional press. The value of free press for democracy is illustrated by the fact that in different parts of the world, the press is one of the only private businesses specifically referred to throughout constitutions. Despite its importance for society and democracy, surveys reveal a concerning decline in its prestige. 61

In the beginning of the digital revolution, there was a belief that the internet should be a free, open, and unregulated space in the interest of protecting access to the platform and promoting freedom of expression. Over time, concerns emerged, and a consensus gradually grew for the need for internet regulation. Multiple approaches for regulating the internet were proposed, including: (a) economic, through antitrust legislation, consumer protection, fair taxation, and copyright rules; (b) privacy, through laws restricting collection of user data without consent, especially for content targeting; and (c) targeting inauthentic behavior, content control, and platform liability rules. 62

Devising the proper balance between the indispensable preservation of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the repression of illegal content on social media on the other, is one of the most complex issues of our generation. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right incorporated into virtually all contemporary constitutions and, in many countries, is considered a preferential freedom. Several reasons have been advanced for granting freedom of expression special protection, including its roles: (a) in the search for the possible truth 63 in an open and plural society, 64 as explored above in discussing the importance of the institutional press; (b) as an essential element for democracy 65 because it allows the free circulation of ideas, information, and opinions that inform public opinion and voting; and (c) as an essential element of human dignity, 66 allowing the expression of an individual’s personality.

The regulation of digital platforms cannot undermine these values but must instead aim at its protection and strengthening. However, in the digital age, these same values that historically justified the reinforced protection of freedom of expression can now justify its regulation. As U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres thoughtfully stated, “the ability to cause large-scale disinformation and undermine scientifically established facts is an existential risk to humanity.” 67

Two aspects of the internet business model are particularly problematic for the protection of democracy and free expression. The first is that, although access to most technological platforms and applications is free, users pay for access with their privacy. 68 As Lawrence Lessig observed, we watch television, but the internet watches us. 69 Everything each individual does online is monitored and monetized. Data is the modern gold. 70 Thus, those who pay for the data can more efficiently disseminate their message through targeted ads. As previously mentioned, the power to modify a person’s information environment has a direct impact on behavior and beliefs, especially when messages are tailored to maximize impact on a specific individual. 71

The second aspect is that algorithms are programmed to maximize time spent online. This often leads to the amplification of provocative, radical, and aggressive content. This in turn compromises freedom of expression because, by targeting engagement, algorithms sacrifice the search for truth (with the wide circulation of fake news), democracy (with attacks on institutions and defense of coups and authoritarianism), and human dignity (with offenses, threats, racism, and others). The pursuit of attention and engagement for revenue is not always compatible with the values that underlie the protection of freedom of expression.

IV. A Framework for the Regulation of Social Media

Platform regulation models can be broadly classified into three categories: (a) state or government regulation, through legislation and rules drawing a compulsory, encompassing framework; (b) self-regulation, through rules drafted by platforms themselves and materialized in their terms of use; and (c) regulated self-regulation or coregulation, through standards fixed by the state but which grant platform flexibility in materializing and implementing them. This Essay argues for the third model, with a combination of governmental and private responsibilities. Compliance should be overseen by an independent committee, with the minority of its representatives coming from the government, and the majority coming from the business sector, academia, technology entities, users, and civil society.

The regulatory framework should aim to reduce the asymmetry of information between platforms and users, safeguard the fundamental right to freedom of expression from undue private or state interventions, and protect and strengthen democracy. The current technical limitations of content moderation algorithms explored above and normal substantive disagreement about what content should be considered illegal or harmful suggest that an ideal regulatory model should optimize the balance between the fundamental rights of users and platforms, recognizing that there will always be cases where consensus is unachievable. The focus of regulation should be the development of adequate procedures for content moderation, capable of minimizing errors and legitimizing decisions even when one disagrees with the substantive result. 72 With these premises as background, the proposal for regulation formulated here is divided into three levels: (a) the appropriate intermediary liability model for user-generated content; (b) procedural duties for content moderation; and (c) minimum duties to moderate content that represents concrete threats to democracy and/or freedom of expression itself.

A. Intermediary Liability for User-Generated Content

There are three main regimes for platform liability for third-party content. In strict liability models, platforms are held responsible for all user-generated posts. 73 Since platforms have limited editorial control over what is posted and limited human oversight over the millions of posts made daily, this would be a potentially destructive regime. In knowledge-based liability models, platform liability arises if they do not act to remove content after an extrajudicial request from users—this is also known as a “notice-and-takedown” system. 74 Finally, a third model would make platforms liable for user-generated content only in cases of noncompliance with a court order mandating content removal. This latter model was adopted in Brazil with the Civil Framework for the Internet (Marco Civil da Internet). 75 The only exception in Brazilian legislation to this general rule is revenge porn: if there is a violation of intimacy resulting from the nonconsensual disclosure of images, videos, or other materials containing private nudity or private sexual acts, extrajudicial notification is sufficient to create an obligation for content removal under penalty of liability. 76

In our view, the Brazilian model is the one that most adequately balances the fundamental rights involved. As mentioned, in the most complex cases concerning freedom of expression, people will disagree on the legality of speech. Rules holding platforms accountable for not removing content after mere user notification create incentives for over-removal of any potentially controversial content, excessively restricting users’ freedom of expression. If the state threatens to hold digital platforms accountable if it disagrees with their assessment, companies will have the incentive to remove all content that could potentially be considered illicit by courts to avoid liability. 77

Nonetheless, this liability regime should coexist with a broader regulatory structure imposing principles, limits, and duties on content moderation by digital platforms, both to increase the legitimacy of platforms’ application of their own terms and conditions and to minimize the potentially devastating impacts of illicit or harmful speech.

B. Standards for Proactive Content Moderation

Platforms have free enterprise and freedom of expression rights to set their own rules and decide the kind of environment they want to create, as well as to moderate harmful content that could drive users away. However, because these content moderation algorithms are the new governors of the public sphere, 78 and because they define the ability to participate and be heard in online public discourse, platforms should abide by minimum procedural duties of transparency and auditing, due process, and fairness.

1. Transparency and Auditing

Transparency and auditing measures serve mainly to ensure that platforms are accountable for content moderation decisions and for the impacts of their algorithms. They provide users with greater understanding and knowledge about the extent to which platforms regulate speech, and they provide oversight bodies and researchers with information to understand the threats of digital services and the role of platforms in amplifying or minimizing them.

Driven by demands from civil society, several digital platforms already publish transparency reports. 79 However, the lack of binding standards means that these reports have significant gaps, no independent verification of the information provided, 80 and no standardization across platforms, preventing comparative analysis. 81 In this context, regulatory initiatives that impose minimum requirements and standards are crucial to make oversight more effective. On the other hand, overly broad transparency mandates may force platforms to adopt simpler content moderation rules to reduce costs, which could negatively impact the accuracy of content moderation or the quality of the user experience. 82 A tiered approach to transparency, where certain information is public and certain information is limited to oversight bodies or previously qualified researchers, ensures adequate protection of countervailing interests, such as user privacy and business confidentiality. 83 The Digital Services Act, 84 recently passed in the European Union, contains robust transparency provisions that generally align with these considerations. 85

The information that should be publicly provided includes clear and unambiguous terms of use, the options available to address violations (such as removal, amplification reduction, clarifications, and account suspension) and the division of labor between algorithms and humans. More importantly, public transparency reports should include information on the accuracy of automated moderation measures and the number of content moderation actions broken down by type (such as removal, blocking, and account deletion). 86 There must also be transparency obligations to researchers, giving them access to crucial information and statistics, including to the content analyzed for the content moderation decisions. 87

Although valuable, transparency requirements are insufficient in promoting accountability because they rely on users and researchers to actively monitor platform conduct and presuppose that they have the power to draw attention to flaws and promote changes. 88 Legally mandated third-party algorithmic auditing is therefore an important complement to ensure that these models satisfy legal, ethical, and safety standards and to elucidate the embedded value tradeoffs, such as between user safety and freedom of expression. 89 As a starting point, algorithm audits should consider matters such as how accurately they perform, any potential bias or discrimination incorporated in the data, and to what extent the internal mechanics are explainable to humans. 90 The Digital Services Act contains a similar proposal. 91

The market for algorithmic auditing is still emergent and replete with uncertainty. In attempting to navigate this scenario, regulators should: (a) define how often the audits should happen; (b) develop standards and best practices for auditing procedures; (c) mandate specific disclosure obligations so auditors have access to the required data; and (d) define how identified harms should be addressed. 92

2. Due Process and Fairness

To ensure due process, platforms must inform users affected by content moderation decisions of the allegedly violated provision of the terms of use, as well as offer an internal system of appeals against these decisions. Platforms must also create systems that allow for the substantiated denunciation of content or accounts by other users, and notify reporting users of the decision taken.

As for fairness, platforms should ensure that the rules are applied equally to all users. Although it is reasonable to suppose that platforms may adopt different criteria for public persons or information of public interest, these exceptions must be clear in the terms of use. This issue has recently been the subject of controversy between the Facebook Oversight Board and the company. 93

Due to the enormous amount of content published on the platforms and the inevitability of using automated mechanisms for content moderation, platforms should not be held accountable for a violation of these duties in specific cases, but only when the analysis reveals a systemic failure to comply. 94

C. Minimum Duties to Moderate Illicit Content

The regulatory framework should also contain specific obligations to address certain types of especially harmful speech. The following categories are considered by the authors to fall within this group: disinformation, hate speech, anti-democratic attacks, cyberbullying, terrorism, and child pornography. Admittedly, defining and consensually identifying the speech included in these categories—except in the case of child pornography 95 —is a complex and largely subjective task. Precisely for this reason, platforms should be free to define how the concepts will be operationalized, as long as they guide definitions by international human rights parameters and in a transparent manner. This does not mean that all platforms will reach the same definitions nor the same substantive results in concrete cases, but this should not be considered a flaw in the system, since the plurality of rules promotes freedom of expression. The obligation to observe international human rights parameters reduces the discretion of companies, while allowing for the diversity of policies among them. After defining these categories, platforms must establish mechanisms that allow users to report violations.

In addition, platforms should develop mechanisms to address coordinated inauthentic behaviors, which involve the use of automated systems or deceitful means to artificially amplify false or dangerous messages by using bots, fake profiles, trolls, and provocateurs. 96 For example, if a person publishes a post for his twenty followers saying that kerosene oil is good for curing COVID-19, the negative impact of this misinformation is limited. However, if that message is amplified to thousands of users, a greater public health issue arises. Or, in another example, if the false message that an election was rigged reaches millions of people, there is a democratic risk due to the loss of institutional credibility.

The role of oversight bodies should be to verify that platforms have adopted terms of use that prohibit the sharing of these categories of speech and ensure that, systemically, the recommendation and content moderation systems are trained to moderate this content.

V. Conclusion

The World Wide Web has provided billions of people with access to knowledge, information, and the public space, changing the course of history. However, the misuse of the internet and social media poses serious threats to democracy and fundamental rights. Some degree of regulation has become necessary to confront inauthentic behavior and illegitimate content. It is essential, however, to act with transparency, proportionality, and adequate procedures, so that pluralism, diversity, and freedom of expression are preserved.

In addition to the importance of regulatory action, the responsibility for the preservation of the internet as a healthy public sphere also lies with citizens. Media education and user awareness are fundamental steps for the creation of a free but positive and constructive environment on the internet. Citizens should be conscious that social media can be unfair, perverse, and can violate fundamental rights and basic rules of democracy. They must be attentive not to uncritically pass on all information received. Alongside states, regulators, and tech companies, citizens are also an important force to address these threats. In Jonathan Haidt’s words, “[w]hen our public square is governed by mob dynamics unrestrained by due process, we don’t get justice and inclusion; we get a society that ignores context, proportionality, mercy, and truth.” 97

• 1 Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? , in The Perilous Public Square 15 (David E. Pozen ed., 2020).
• 2 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle , 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2011, 2019 (2018).
• 3 Luís Roberto Barroso, O Constitucionalismo Democrático ou Neoconstitucionalismo como ideologia vitoriosa do século XX , 4 Revista Publicum 14, 14 (2018).
• 4 Id. at 16.
• 7 Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a New Political Debate xii (2006); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 181 (1977).
• 8 Barroso, supra note 3, at 16.
• 9 Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts i (2015).
• 10 Larry Diamond, Facing up to the Democratic Recession , 26 J. Democracy 141 (2015). Other scholars have referred to the same phenomenon using other terms, such as democratic retrogression, abusive constitutionalism, competitive authoritarianism, illiberal democracy, and autocratic legalism. See, e.g. , Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy , 65 UCLA L. Rev. 91 (2018); David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism , 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 189 (2013); Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism , 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 545 (2018).
• 11 Dan Balz, A Year After Jan. 6, Are the Guardrails that Protect Democracy Real or Illusory? , Wash. Post (Jan. 6, 2022), https://perma.cc/633Z-A9AJ; Brexit: Reaction from Around the UK , BBC News (June 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/JHM3-WD7A.
• 12 Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist , 39 Gov’t & Opposition 541, 549 (2004).
• 13 See generally Mohammed Sinan Siyech, An Introduction to Right-Wing Extremism in India , 33 New Eng. J. Pub. Pol’y 1 (2021) (discussing right-wing extremism in India). See also Eviane Leidig, Hindutva as a Variant of Right-Wing Extremism , 54 Patterns of Prejudice 215 (2020) (tracing the history of “Hindutva”—defined as “an ideology that encompasses a wide range of forms, from violent, paramilitary fringe groups, to organizations that advocate the restoration of Hindu ‘culture’, to mainstream political parties”—and finding that it has become mainstream since 2014 under Modi); Ariel Goldstein, Brazil Leads the Third Wave of the Latin American Far Right , Ctr. for Rsch. on Extremism (Mar. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/4PCT-NLQJ (discussing right-wing extremism in Brazil under Bolsonaro); Seth G. Jones, The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States , Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Nov. 2018), https://perma.cc/983S-JUA7 (discussing right-wing extremism in the U.S. under Trump).
• 14 Sergio Fausto, O Desafio Democrático [The Democratic Challenge], Piauí (Aug. 2022), https://perma.cc/474A-3849.
• 15 Jan-Werner Muller, Populism and Constitutionalism , in The Oxford Handbook of Populism 590 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017).
• 16 Ming-Sung Kuo, Against Instantaneous Democracy , 17 Int’l J. Const. L. 554, 558–59 (2019); see also Digital Populism , Eur. Ctr. for Populism Stud., https://perma.cc/D7EV-48MV.
• 17 Luís Roberto Barroso, Technological Revolution, Democratic Recession and Climate Change: The Limits of Law in a Changing World , 18 Int’l J. Const. L. 334, 349 (2020).
• 18 For the use of social media, see Sven Engesser et al., Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented Ideology , 20 Info. Commc’n & Soc’y 1109 (2017). For attacks on the press, see WPFD 2021: Attacks on Press Freedom Growing Bolder Amid Rising Authoritarianism , Int’l Press Inst. (Apr. 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/SGN9-55A8. For attacks on the judiciary, see Michael Dichio & Igor Logvinenko, Authoritarian Populism, Courts and Democratic Erosion , Just Sec. (Feb. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/WZ6J-YG49.
• 19 Kuo, supra note 16, at 558–59; see also Digital Populism , supra note 16.
• 20 Vicki C. Jackson, Knowledge Institutions in Constitutional Democracy: Reflections on “the Press” , 15 J. Media L. 275 (2022).
• 21 Many of the ideas and information on this topic were collected in Luna van Brussel Barroso, Liberdade de Expressão e Democracia na Era Digital: O impacto das mídias sociais no mundo contemporâneo [Freedom of Expression and Democracy in the Digital Era: The Impact of Social Media in the Contemporary World] (2022), which was recently published in Brazil.
• 22 The first industrial revolution is marked by the use of steam as a source of energy in the middle of the 18th century. The second started with the use of electricity and the invention of the internal combustion engine at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. There are already talks of the fourth industrial revolution as a product of the fusion of technologies that blurs the boundaries among the physical, digital, and biological spheres. See generally Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (2017).
• 23 Gregory P. Magarian, The Internet and Social Media , in The Oxford Handbook of Freedom of Speech 350, 351–52 (Adrienne Stone & Frederick Schauer eds., 2021).
• 24 Wu, supra note 1, at 15.
• 25 Journalistic ethics include distinguishing fact from opinion, verifying the veracity of what is published, having no self-interest in the matter being reported, listening to the other side, and rectifying mistakes. For an example of an international journalistic ethics charter, see Global Charter of Ethics for Journalists , Int’l Fed’n of Journalists (June 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/7A2C-JD2S.
• 26 See, e.g. , New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
• 27 Balkin, supra note 2, at 2018.
• 28 Magarian, supra note 23, at 351–52.
• 29 Wu, supra note 1, at 15.
• 30 Magarian, supra note 23, at 357–60.
• 31 Niva Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel, Speech Contestation by Design: Democratizing Speech Governance by AI , 50 Fla. State U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023).
• 32 Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures and Newsworthiness in Online Speech , 93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 37, 94 (2019).
• 33 Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 31.
• 34 Chris Meserole, How Do Recommender Systems Work on Digital Platforms? , Brookings Inst.(Sept. 21, 2022), https://perma.cc/H53K-SENM.
• 35 Kris Shaffer, Data versus Democracy: How Big Data Algorithms Shape Opinions and Alter the Course of History xi–xv (2019).
• 36 See generally Stuart Russell, Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control (2019).
• 37 Shaffer, supra note 35, at xi–xv.
• 38 More recently, with the advance of neuroscience, platforms have sharpened their ability to manipulate and change our emotions, feelings and, consequently, our behavior in accordance not with our own interests, but with theirs (or of those who they sell this service to). Kaveh Waddell, Advertisers Want to Mine Your Brain , Axios (June 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/EU85-85WX. In this context, there is already talk of a new fundamental right to cognitive liberty, mental self-determination, or the right to free will. Id .
• 39 Content moderation refers to “systems that classify user generated content based on either matching or prediction, leading to a decision and governance outcome (e.g. removal, geoblocking, account takedown).” Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns & Christian Katzenbach, Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in the Automation of Platform Governance , 7 Big Data & Soc’y 1, 3 (2020).
• 40 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation , 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1149, 1183 (2018).
• 41 See Carey Shenkman, Dhanaraj Thakur & Emma Llansó, Do You See What I See? Capabilities and Limits of Automated Multimedia Content Analysis 13–16 (May 2021),https://perma.cc/J9MP-7PQ8.
• 42 See id. at 17–21.
• 43 See Michael Wooldridge, A Brief History of Artificial Intelligence: What It Is, Where We Are, and Where We Are Going 63 (2021).

Perceptual hashing has been the primary technology utilized to mitigate the spread of CSAM, since the same materials are often repeatedly shared, and databases of offending content are maintained by institutions like the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) and its international analogue, the International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (ICMEC).

• 45 Natural language understanding is undermined by language ambiguity, contextual dependence of words of non-immediate proximity, references, metaphors, and general semantics rules. See Erik J. Larson, The Myth of Artificial Intelligence: Why Computers Can’t Think the Way We Do 52–55 (2021). Language comprehension in fact requires unlimited common-sense knowledge about the actual world, which humans possess and is impossible to code. Id . A case decided by Facebook’s Oversight Board illustrates the point: the company’s predictive filter for combatting pornography removed images from a breast cancer awareness campaign, a clearly legitimate content not meant to be targeted by the algorithm. See Breast Cancer Symptoms and Nudity , Oversight Bd. (2020), https://perma.cc/U9A5-TTTJ. However, based on prior training, the algorithm removed the publication because it detected pornography and was unable to factor the contextual consideration that this was a legitimate health campaign. Id .
• 46 See generally Adriano Koshiyama, Emre Kazim & Philip Treleaven, Algorithm Auditing: Managing the Legal, Ethical, and Technological Risks of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Associated Algorithms , 55 Computer 40 (2022).
• 47 Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 31.
• 48 Evelyn Douek, Governing Online Speech: From “Posts-as-Trumps” to Proportionality and Probability , 121 Colum. L. Rev. 759, 791 (2021).
• 53 See Martha Minow, Saving the Press: Why the Constitution Calls for Government Action to Preserve Freedom of Speech 20 (2021). For example, the best-selling newspaper in the world, The New York Times , ended the year 2022 with around 10 million subscribers across digital and print. Katie Robertson, The New York Times Company Adds 180,000 Digital Subscribers , N.Y. Times (Nov. 2, 2022), https://perma.cc/93PF-TKC5. The Economist magazine had approximately 1.2 million subscribers in 2022. The Economist Group, Annual Report 2022 24 (2022), https://perma.cc/9HQQ-F7W2. Around the world, publications that reach one million subscribers are rare. These Are the Most Popular Paid Subscription News Websites , World Econ. F. (Apr. 29, 2021), https://perma.cc/L2MK-VPNX.
• 54 Lawrence Lessig, They Don’t Represent Us: Reclaiming Our Democracy 105 (2019).
• 55 Essential Facebook Statistics and Trends for 2023 , Datareportal (Feb. 19, 2023), https://perma.cc/UH33-JHUQ.
• 56 YouTube User Statistics 2023 , Glob. Media Insight (Feb. 27, 2023), https://perma.cc/3H4Y-H83V.
• 57 Brian Dean, WhatsApp 2022 User Statistics: How Many People Use WhatsApp , Backlinko (Jan. 5, 2022), https://perma.cc/S8JX-S7HN.
• 58 Confirmation bias, the tendency to seek out and favor information that reinforces one’s existing beliefs, presents an obstacle to critical thinking. Sachin Modgil et al., A Confirmation Bias View on Social Media Induced Polarisation During COVID-19 , Info. Sys. Frontiers (Nov. 20, 2021).
• 59 Minow, supra note 53, at 2.
• 60 Id. at 3, 11.
• 61 On the importance of the role of the press as an institution of public interest and its “crucial relationship” with democracy, see id. at 35. On the press as a “knowledge institution,” the idea of “institutional press,” and data on the loss of prestige by newspapers and television stations, see Jackson, supra note 20, at 4–5.
• 62 See , e.g. , Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media , 1 J. Free Speech L. 71, 89–96 (2021).
• 63 By possible truth we mean that not all claims, opinions and beliefs can be ascertained as true or false. Objective truths are factual and can thus be proven even when controversial—for example, climate change and the effectiveness of vaccines. Subjective truths, on the other hand, derive from individual normative, religious, philosophical, and political views. In a pluralistic world, any conception of freedom of expression must protect individual subjective beliefs.
• 64 Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection , 97 Va. L. Rev. 595, 595 (May 2011).
• 66 Steven J. Heyman, Free Speech and Human Dignity 2 (2008).
• 67 A Global Dialogue to Guide Regulation Worldwide , UNESCO (Feb. 23, 2023), https://perma.cc/ALK8-HTG3.
• 68 Can We Fix What’s Wrong with Social Media? , Yale L. Sch. News (Aug. 3, 2022), https://perma.cc/MN58-2EVK.
• 69 Lessig, supra note 54, at 105.
• 71 See supra Part III.B.
• 72 Doeuk, supra note 48, at 804–13; see also John Bowers & Jonathan Zittrain, Answering Impossible Questions: Content Governance in an Age of Disinformation , Harv. Kennedy Sch. Misinformation Rev. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/R7WW-8MQX.
• 73 Daphne Keller, Systemic Duties of Care and Intermediary Liability , Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y Blog (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/25GU-URGT.
• 75 Decreto No. 12.965, de 23 de abril de 2014, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 4.14.2014 (Braz.) art. 19. In order to ensure freedom of expression and prevent censorship, providers of internet applications can only be civilly liable for damages resulting from content generated by third parties if, after specific court order, they do not make arrangements to, in the scope and technical limits of their service and within the indicated time, make unavailable the content identified as infringing, otherwise subject to the applicable legal provisions. Id .
• 76 Id. art. 21. The internet application provider that provides content generated by third parties will be held liable for the violation of intimacy resulting from the disclosure, without authorization of its participants, of images, videos, or other materials containing nude scenes or private sexual acts when, upon receipt of notification by the participant or its legal representative, fail to diligently promote, within the scope and technical limits of its service, the unavailability of this content. Id .
• 77 Balkin, supra note 2, at 2017.
• 78 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech , 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1603 (2018).
• 79 Transparency Reporting Index, Access Now (July 2021), https://perma.cc/2TSL-2KLD (cataloguing transparency reporting from companies around the world).
• 80 Hum. Rts. Comm., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, ¶¶ 63–66, U.N. Doc A/HRC/32/35 (2016).
• 81 Paddy Leerssen, The Soap Box as a Black Box: Regulating Transparency in Social Media Recommender Systems , 11 Eur. J. L. & Tech. (2020).
• 82 Daphne Keller, Some Humility About Transparency , Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y Blog (Mar. 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/4Y85-BATA.
• 83 Mark MacCarthy, Transparency Requirements for Digital Social Media Platforms: Recommendations for Policy Makers and Industry , Transatlantic Working Grp. (Feb. 12, 2020).
• 84 2022 O.J. (L 277) 1 [hereinafter DSA].
• 85 The DSA was approved by the European Parliament on July 5, 2022, and on October 4, 2022, the European Council gave its final acquiescence to the regulation. Digital Services: Landmark Rules Adopted for a Safer, Open Online Environment , Eur. Parliament (July 5, 2022), https://perma.cc/BZP5-V2B2. The DSA increases transparency and accountability of platforms, by providing, for example, for the obligation of “clear information on content moderation or the use of algorithms for recommending content (so-called recommender systems); users will be able to challenge content moderation decisions.” Id .
• 86 MacCarthy, supra note 83, 19–24.
• 87 To this end, American legislators recently introduced a U.S. Congressional bill that proposes a model for conducting research on the impacts of digital communications in a way that protects user privacy. See Platform Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 5339, 117th Congress (2022). The project mandates that digital platforms share data with researchers previously authorized by the Federal Trade Commission and publicly disclose certain data about content, algorithms, and advertising. Id .
• 88 Yifat Nahmias & Maayan Perel, The Oversight of Content Moderation by AI: Impact Assessment and Their Limitations , 58 Harv. J. on Legis. 145, 154–57 (2021).
• 89 Auditing Algorithms: The Existing Landscape, Role of Regulator and Future Outlook , Digit. Regul. Coop. F. (Sept. 23, 2022), https://perma.cc/7N6W-JNCW.
• 90 See generally Koshiyama et al., supra note 46.
• 91 In Article 37, the DSA provides that digital platforms of a certain size should be accountable, through annual independent auditing, for compliance with the obligations set forth in the Regulation and with any commitment undertaken pursuant to codes of conduct and crisis protocols.
• 92 Digit. Regul. Coop. F., supra note 89.
• 93 In a transparency report published at the end of its first year of operation, the Oversight Board highlighted the inadequacy of the explanations presented by Meta on the operation of a system known as cross-check, which apparently gave some users greater freedom on the platform. In January 2022, Meta explained that the cross-check system grants an additional degree of review to certain content that internal systems mark as violating the platform’s terms of use. Meta submitted a query to the Board on how to improve the functioning of this system and the Board made relevant recommendations. See Oversight Board Published Policy Advisory Opinion on Meta’s Cross-Check Program , Oversight Bd. (Dec. 2022), https://perma.cc/87Z5-L759.
• 94 Evelyn Douek, Content Moderation as Systems Thinking , 136 Harv. L. Rev. 526, 602–03 (2022).
• 95 The illicit nature of child pornography is objectively apprehended and does not implicate the same subjective considerations that the other referenced categories entail. Not surprisingly, several databases have been created to facilitate the moderation of this content. See Ofcom, Overview of Perceptual Hashing Technology 14 (Nov. 22, 2022), https://perma.cc/EJ45-B76X (“Several hash databases to support the detection of known CSAM exist, e.g. the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) hash database, the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) hash list and the International Child Sexual Exploitation (ICSE) hash database.”).
• 97 Jonathan Haidt, Why the Past 10 Years of American Life Have Been Uniquely Stupid , Atlantic (Apr. 11, 2022), https://perma.cc/2NXD-32VM.

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Essay on Truth | Truth Essay for Students and Children in English

February 13, 2024 by Prasanna

Essay on Truth:  The term truth can be defined as the property according to reality or fact. Truth is attributed to things that aim to represent reality or otherwise correspond to it with propositions, beliefs, and declarative sentences.

The concept of truth is a completely subjective topic, and it varies from person to person. Truth is usually held in contrast to falsity. The idea of truth is debated and discussed in different contexts, including science, art, philosophy, and theology.

You can also find more  Essay Writing  articles on events, persons, sports, technology and many more.

Long and Short Essays on Truth for Students and Kids in English

We provide students with essay samples on a long Truth essay of 500 words and a short essay of 150 words on the same topic for reference.

Long Essay on Truth 500 Words in English

Long Essay on Truth is usually given to classes 7, 8, 9, and 10.

For centuries, there has been a conflict between what is right and what is wrong. Many conservatives still believe that truth is absolute reality, and there is no falsity involved. However, others tend to disagree who believe that truth is relative – it is an individual’s perception of beliefs and decisions.

For this reason, among individuals, truth differs through their contrasting opinions. However, truth is something that everyone believes to be correct. Hence it greatly depends on what is true in the minds of people. On the other hand, the truth spoken with a bad intention can be worse than a lie. Therefore truth is a statement or expression that corresponds with reality and happiness.

Today’s society places a high value on truth and the person who speaks the truth. Truth serves as a foundation of a fair and just society. In court, witnesses are required to swear to tell the truth – in this way, and justice can be delivered. Most modern religions have an opinion on the matter, and they place a high value on the principles of truthfulness. Broadly, there are two aspects of truthfulness: being true to others and being true to oneself. The two are not wholly the same thing; however, they are closely linked.

Truthful people understand themselves better. They know their strengths and weaknesses, and their successes and failures do not deceive them. Truth helps people in expressing their true selves and showcasing who they are. It helps them in being accurate in their descriptions of themselves and others and meeting any commitments or promises that one makes.

Truth matters, and it is important both to an individual and society as a whole as an individual being truthful means that one can grow and mature by learning from their mistakes. For society, truthfulness helps in building social bonds. At the same time, lying and hypocrisy has an adverse effect and break those bonds. There are two possible ways of not telling the truth -firstly by not providing all the information. Some people refrain from becoming overly personal, even if it is the truth. It depends on the context and whether the people need to know about the details. Some people even stop themselves from sharing anything at all.

Providing false information is wrong. Some people tend to lie to get themselves out of a situation or not hurt anyone’s feelings. However, in some scenarios, it becomes necessary to lie. Just like any other quality, in truthfulness finding the balance is essential. One should neither overplay nor underplay their weaknesses or their virtues. It is as bad to pretend that one is less good in something than they are as to exaggerate about their abilities.

It is important to live and act following one’s values. Being truthful to oneself is vital as one cannot live in line with their values if they keep pretending to themselves that they are something else. Being truthful helps individuals be honest about themselves, allowing them to live a life that reflects it.

Short Essay on Truth 150 Words in English

Short Essay on Truth is usually given to classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Truth is defined as something that is following reality. Truth can be relative to a person and dominated by an individual’s subjective thoughts and believes. Truth is the purity that helps in differentiating between right and wrong. The ‘absolute truth’ is regardless of what one thinks and believes in.

Truth is what corresponds with the available facts and pieces of evidence. Truth does not change just because we learn something about it. However, it is not good to always tell the truth. If the main purpose of telling the truth is to hurt someone, it is then considered to be terrible than the most terrible lie. This is why many people keep in mind other people’s sentiments and beliefs before telling the truth. Sometimes, not telling the truth doesn’t necessarily mean someone has to lie. It can also be keeping from them a few details that they don’t need to know.

10 Lines on Truth in English

• Being truthful is vital in life because it brings happiness and builds strong trust bonds with people.
• Truth is subjective and is relatively different for every person.
• Truth coincides with facts and reality.
• Truth is a statement that never changes, no matter how people feel about it.
• Truth can be very complicated sometimes, and various people interpret it differently.
• Truth is the reality and the actions without any filter or edits.
• Telling the truth and accepting it are two completely different things.
• It is easier to tell a lie, but truth has its beauty and depth.
• The lie’s path is easy and short, whereas the truth is long-lived and helps achieve sincerity.
• The one who follows the path of truth always ends up happy, contented, and successful.

FAQ’s on Truth Essay

Question 1. Is truth an important value of life?

Answer: Truth serves as the building block of the qualities of life like morality, equality, justice, peace, love, security, freedom, spirituality, and even survival.

Question 2. Is it okay to lie sometimes?

Answer: Even though it is always right to stick to the truth, sometimes the truth can be harsh and hurt others’ sentiments and feelings. So, sometimes to refrain from hurting someone, it’s okay to lie.

Question 3.  How can one tell which is the truth?

Answer: Truth is the reality that is following the facts and shreds of evidence.

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The Role of Truth

Related Papers

Matthias Schirn

In this essay, I analyze several aspects of Frege's paradigms of second-order abstraction: Axiom V and Hume's Principle. The issues dealt with include self-evidence and epistemic (non-)triviality with particular emphasis on Axiom V, Frege's attitude towards Axiom V before and after Russell's discovery of the contradiction, as well as the possible role and the status of Hume's Principle in the face of Russell's paradox. In the central part (in sections 4, 5, 6), I pursue a threefold aim: (a) to shed new light on the connection between Frege's way of introducing the primitive function-names of his formal language and the requisite self-evidence of his axioms in whose expression such a function-name occurs; (b) to analyze the semantic nature of the linguistic expression of Axiom V, and (c) to examine the conflict between the requirements of self-evidence and real epistemic value or genuine knowledge arising inevitably and invariably from Fregean abstraction principles, if they are singled out as axioms of a theory T. In the final section, I make critical remarks on Frege's reactions to Russell's paradox in the period 1902-1906.

Kai Wehmeier

Routledge Handbook on Linguistic Reference

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Tom Lockhart

Frege's concern in GGI §10 is neither (as is often assumed) with the epistemological issue of how we come to know about value-ranges, nor (as is often assumed) with the semantic-metaphysical issue of whether we have said enough about such objects in order to ensure that any kind of reference to them is possible. The problem which occupies Frege in GGI §10 is the general problem according to which we 'can-not yet decide', for any arbitrary function Φ(ξ), what value 'Φ(ℵ)' has if 'ℵ' is a canonical value-range name. This is a problem with the 'reference' of value-name terms, but only in the weak sense that, if we do not exercise care, value-range terms might become 'bedeutungs-los' for purely formal reasons. Frege addresses the general problem only for the primitive function-and object-names he has already introduced into his concept-script. I argue that this methodology was perfectly intentional: his intention for GG in general, on display in GGI §10, is to to check, for each primitive function-and object-name, as it is introduced into concept-script, whether it interacts with the other primitive names which have already been introduced in such a way that these atomic combinations of primitive names do not become bedeutungslos. If there is a risk of producing a bedeutungslos combination, Frege will make an arbitrary stipulation to ensure that logical hygiene is maintained. I argue that this interpretation does not violate some of the other principal commitments of GG.

Synthese 121, 1999, 309–328

In this paper, I consider two curious subsystems of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: Richard Heck’s predicative fragment H, consisting of schema V together with predicative second-order comprehension (in a language containing a syntactical abstraction operator), and a theory T_Delta in monadic second-order logic, consisting of axiom V and Delta^1_1- comprehension (in a language containing an abstraction function). I provide a consistency proof for the latter theory, thereby refuting a version of a conjecture by Heck. It is shown that both H and T_Delta prove the existence of infinitely many non-logical objects (T_Delta deriving, moreover, the nonexistence of the value-range concept). Some implications concerning the interpretation of Frege’s proof of referentiality and the possibility of classifying any of these subsystems as logicist are discussed. Finally, I explore the relation of T_Delta to Cantor’s theorem which is somewhat surprising.

Synthese 147, 2005, 43–61

In Section 10 of Grundgesetze, Volume I, Frege advances a mathematical argument (known as the permutation argument), by means of which he intends to show that an arbitrary value-range may be identified with the True, and any other one with the False, without contradicting any stipulations previously introduced (we shall call this claim the identifiability thesis, following Schroeder-Heister (1987)). As far as we are aware, there is no consensus in the literature as to (i) the proper interpretation of the permutation argument and the identifiability thesis, (ii) the validity of the permutation argument, and (iii) the truth of the identifiability thesis. In this paper, we undertake a detailed technical study of the two main lines of interpretation, and gather some evidence for favoring one interpretation over the other.

Walter B. Pedriali

Chapter 8 in The History of Philosophical and Formal Logic. From Aristotle to Tarski, Alex Malpass and Marianna Antonutti Marfori (eds.), Bloomsbury: London New York, 2017

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This volume contains 18 essays which celebrate Eva Picardi's work.

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Essay on Honesty for Students and Children

 500+ words essay on honesty.

Honesty implies being truthful. Honesty means to develop a practice of speaking truth throughout life. A person who practices Honesty in his/her life, possess strong moral character. An Honest person shows good behavior, always follows rules and regulations, maintain discipline, speak the truth, and is punctual. An honest person is trustworthy as he always tends to speak the truth.

Honesty is the Best Policy

A major component for developing moral character is Honesty. Honesty helps in developing good attributes like kindness, discipline, truthfulness, moral integrity and more. Lying, cheating, lack of trust, steal, greed and other immoral attributes have no part in Honesty. Honest people are sincere, trustworthy and loyal, throughout their life. Honesty is valuable and it is the habit of utmost importance. There are famous quotes, said by a great personality like “Honesty is the first chapter in the book of wisdom”. It holds good due to its ability to build, shape and motivate integral values in one’s life.

Benefits of Honesty

Honesty is always admirable in the family, civil society, friends and across the globe. A person with honesty is respected by all. For one to build the character of Honesty entirely depends on his/her family values and ethics and his/her surrounding environment. Parents showing honest behavior and character in front of their children create an impact on the children and we say “Honesty lies in their genes”. Honesty can also be developed practically which requires proper guidance, encouragement, patience, and dedication.

An honest person is always known for his/her honesty just like a sun is known for its eternal light and unlimited energy. It is a quality which helps a person to succeed in life and get much respect. It gives identification to the moral character of a person. Dishonest people may easily get trust and respect from other people. However, they lose that forever whenever they get caught.

Being dishonest is a sin in all the religions, however, people practice it for their short time benefits and selfishness. They never become morally strong and their life becomes miserable. An honest person moves freely in society and spread his/her fragrance in all directions. Being honest is never mean to bear the bad habits of others or bear ill-treated activities. Everyone has rights to reveal and take action against what is going wrong with him.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Importance of Honesty in Life

Honesty plays an important role in everyone’s life and it is a character which is visible with open eyes like an open book. Having considered as an Honest person, by society is one of the best compliment one can dream of in his/her entire life. It is the real character a person earns in life by being sincere and dedicated towards it. Lack of honesty in society is doom. It is due to the lack of proper interpersonal relationship between parents-children and students-teachers. Honesty is a practice which is built slowly and patiently, firstly at home and then school. Hence home and school are the best places for a child to develop Honesty since his/her growing times.

Home and school are the places where a child learns moral ethics. Thus, the education system should ensure to include some essential habits and practices to keep a child close to morality. Children must be instructed right from the beginning and their childhood to practice honesty. Youths of any country are the future of that country so they should give better opportunities to develop moral character so that they can lead their country in a better way.

For all human problems, Honesty is the ultimate solution. Corruption and various problems are everywhere in society. It is because of the decreasing number of honest people. In today’s fast and competitive world, we have forgotten about moral and integral ethics. It is very important and necessary for us to rethink and remodel, that we bring the honesty back in society so that everything goes in a natural manner.

Moral ethics of a person is known through Honesty. In a society, if all the people seriously practice getting honest, then society will become an ideal society and free of all the corruptions and evils. There will be huge changes in the day-to-day life of everyone. It can happen very easily if all the parents and teachers understand their responsibilities towards the nation and teach their children and students about moral ethics.

People should realize the value of honesty in order to manage social and economic balance. Honesty is an essential requirement in modern time. It is one of the best habits which encourages an individual and make capable enough to solve and handle any difficult situation in his/her life. Honesty acts as a catalyst in strengthening our will power to face and fight any odds in life.

FAQs on  Essay on Honesty

Q.1. What are the basic principles that were followed by Gandhiji?

Ans: The six principles followed by Gandhiji were Truth, Non-Violence, Simplicity, Faith, Selflessness, and Respect for an Individual.

Q.2. Who gave the proverb, “Honesty is the Best Policy”? Ans: Benjamin Franklin one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, gave the proverb, “Honesty is the Best Policy”.

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Home — Essay Samples — Literature — Jasper Jones — The Role of Truth and Justice in Jasper Jones

The Role of Truth and Justice in Jasper Jones

• Categories: Book Review Jasper Jones Novel

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Introduction to reputation in the crucible, john proctor's struggle with reputation, figurative language and reputation, biblical allusions and the quest for a good name, conclusion: the crucible's commentary on reputation.

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The ‘Swift Boating’ of Tim Walz has begun. What is the truth?

By Matt White , Patty Nieberg

Posted on Aug 7, 2024 5:02 PM EDT

8 minute read

Questions about the final months of Tim Walz’s 24-year National Guard career have triggered a flurry of questions and confusion among military members and veterans, and Wednesday drew a sharp accusation from Walz’s vice presidential opponent, Republican J.D. Vance. In a bitter attack at a rally in Michigan, Vance claimed Walz “abandoned” his guard unit in 2005, just before a deployment to Iraq.

“When Tim Walz was asked by his country to go to Iraq, you know what he did?,” Vance said Wednesday in Shelby Township, Michigan. “He dropped out of the Army and allowed his unit to go without him.”

Accusing a 24-year veteran and former command sergeant major of abandoning his troops by ducking combat is a grave insult in the veteran community, and strikes deep emotions in many. By Wednesday afternoon, a conservative influencer had called for veterans to post pictures of themselves while deployed under the meme “Me not being Tim Walz,” drawing hundreds of responses .

But attacks on veteran service records are not new in politics.

At least one soldier who knew Walz as well as any has defended him — despite not being a fan. Joseph Eustice, whose personal Facebook page today has anti-Walz posts, held the same job as Walz — command sergeant major of 1st battalion, 125th Artillery Regiment.

When the retirement controversy flared up in 2022, Eustice told local media that Walz fulfilled his duty.

“He was a great soldier,” Eustice told the Star Tribune. “When he chose to leave, he had every right to leave.”

Several other soldiers from Walz’s unit echoed that sentiment, including a former brigadier general.

Eustice speculated the controversy could be stoked by sour grapes by a soldier who was passed over for the promotion to command sergeant major that went to Walz.

Still, the assault on Walz’s retirement appears to have caught the Harris-Walz campaign completely unaware. A Minnesota government spokesperson for Walz told Task & Purpose of Walz’s retirement, “In May 2005, Walz retired to run for Congress following 24 years of service.” They did not address whether Walz knew a deployment was pending or if he actively sought to avoid it.

Tim Walz’s retirement timeline

The timeline of Walz’s service and the deployment of his unit, the 1st Battalion, 125th Field Artillery Regiment, is relatively clear, through public records, news accounts and press releases at the time:

• April 2004 : Walz returns to Minnesota with the 1/125th after a year long deployment as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Turkey and Europe. Walz was stationed at Vicenza, Italy, where the unit pulled guard duty on friendly military bases, which may have been back-fill duty for active duty units deployed to Afghanistan. He was promoted to command sergeant major of the battalion soon after returning.
• March 2005 : Walz’s newly-formed campaign for a Congressional House seat releases a press release that indicates Walz is aware of a possible but unconfirmed deployment , though no official orders have been announced. “The National Guard Public Affairs Office announced a possible partial mobilization of roughly 2,000 troops from the Minnesota National Guard,” the press release said. “The announcement from the National Guard PAO specified that all or a portion of Walz’s battalion could be mobilized to serve in Iraq within the next two years… When asked about his possible deployment to Iraq Walz said, ‘As Command Sergeant Major I have a responsibility not only to ready my battalion for Iraq, but also to serve if called on. I am dedicated to serving my country to the best of my ability, whether that is in Washington DC or in Iraq.”
• May 2005 : Walz officially retires from the Minnesota National Guard after 24 years of service, according to documents posted online that appear to be his NGB Form 22, a Report of Separation and Record of Service. Walz previously retired after 20 years of service but returned to service after Sept. 11, he wrote in a Winona Daily News opinion piece , re-enlisting for four years. However, his NGB Form 22 indicates his “terminal reserve/military service obligation” date was September 2007.
• July 2005 : The 125th Field Artillery Regiment receives initial call-up orders and, that fall, deploys for training in Mississippi as part of the 34th Infantry Divisions’ 1st Brigade Combat Team.
• March 2006 : The 125th deploys to Iraq, 10 months after Walz had separated from the unit. The unit will not return until September 2007.

Many details of Walz’s decision process remain unclear. The press release by Walz’s campaign indicates he knew a deployment was possible at least four months before the unit received official orders and two before he retired. But that timeline could have several missing pieces.

For one, such advanced ‘heads-up’ notice is commonly provided to senior leaders of deployable units, and can often change or fall through as Pentagon planners shuffle deployment plans a year or more ahead of time.

A second uncertainty lies in the May 2005 retirement date. Though that was when Walz’s retirement became official. it likely came many months after he ‘dropped his papers’ to inform his chain of command he intended to retire, beginning the process. Reporting by the Washington Post on Wednesday indicates that Walz spoke to several soldiers in the unit about his conflicted thoughts before deciding to retire .

Walz’s military experience is being touted by Democrats as a strong part of his appeal to voters and a testimony to her personal values and commitment to defense and veterans issues as a lawmaker. Patrick Murphy, a former  Under Secretary of the Army and the first Iraq war veteran to be elected to the  United States House of Representatives , told Task & Purpose that Walz will absolute get veterans to vote for the Harris-Walz ticket.

“There are 900,000 veterans in Pennsylvania ready to run through a wall for Tim Walz,” Murphy said.

But Vance’s attack, echoing accusations Walz faced in his 2022 race for Governor, characterized that retirement as a kind of betrayal — and an echo of attacks that military veterans have faced in previous political races.

‘Swift boat’

Vance’s attacks on Wednesday echo a wide range of Republican officials and other conservatives who within hours of Walz introduction rushed to announce they are eager to “swiftboat” Walz.

“Swiftboat” is a political short-hand for the 2004 media campaign that attacked Democrat John Kerry’s combat experience as a Navy officer aboard riverine patrol boats in Vietnam, known to their crews as Swift Boats. That campaign, run by a group calling itself Swift Boat Veterans for Truth , was run by Chris LaCivita , who is now a co-manager of Donald Trump’s Presidential campaign.

LaCivita has posted at least three times about Walz’s retirement in the last day, more than any other topic about the new Vice Presidential candidate.

The attacks on Walz’s service go back to his run for Minnesota Governor. In November 2018, two retired Minnesota Guard command sergeant majors , including one that took over Walz’s position as command sergeant major, wrote a paid endorsement letter to the editor of the West Central Tribune, a Minnesota newspaper. They described Walz’s retirement ahead of his battalion’s Iraq deployment as quitting and leaving the battalion’s soldiers “hanging” and “without its senior Non-Commissioned Officer, as the battalion prepared for war.” 

Wednesday, the attacks appeared to be gathering steam among veterans online. 

Command Sergeant Major ‘reduction’ to Master Sergeant

A second issue for Walz may be his retirement rank. He served as the 125th’s command sergeant major, an E-9, the Army’s highest enlisted rank. But, according to the Minnesota Guard, his retirement status and benefits was reduced to that of an E-8 because he did not complete training required of all E-9s.

“Soldiers who do not finish the course revert back to their prior rank,” a National Guard spokesperson told Task & Purpose. “This is what we refer to as an administrative reduction and not punitive in nature.”

The course Walz failed to complete was a 750-hour course in the Army’s Sergeants Major Academy, which would have included 86 hours in residence at Ft. Bliss, Texas. Completing the course is mandatory for E-9s, though completing the training after being promoted is not uncommon. But without the training, Walz was not eligible to retire as a full E-9 and his retired status and benefits were ‘reduced’ to E-8 after he left service.

The Minnesota Guard confirmed to Task & Purpose that Walz was properly promoted and served in the E-9 role, and “retired as” an E-9, despite the later reduction. His campaign website for earlier races has said : “When he retired, Tim was the highest-ranking enlisted National Guard soldier in southern Minnesota.”  

Jeffrey Frisby, former master sergeant for the Arkansas National Guard and executive director of the Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States said similar situations still occur.

“I don’t know that we would put on that rank, but we would definitely serve in that position,” he said. “I do think that that still happens and I do think that people serve in capacities above their rank but above their official military pay grade to serve in a leadership position still today.”

A gap in a leadership position like CSM could’ve meant that “if they didn’t put someone in there to manage those tasks, to oversee those soldiers, oversee that training, then something was gonna get missed and something might not have been done to standard,” Frisby said. For CSMs in particular, he said, they manage transportation, food, lodging, and “soldier care” issues. 

“They might have missed training events and training timelines so to have someone in that leadership role is very important, even if you’re just an acting position,” Frisby said. “Even though he wasn’t eligible for that command title, we would probably still put him in that role and let him serve in that capacity because somebody in that chain of command thought this was the right guy for the job.”

UPDATE , 8/7/2024 : this story has been updated to include the 1/125th’s 2003 deployment to Italy in the timeline and the 2005 press release from his campaign. A misstatement of Walz’s highest rank, command sergeant major, was also corrected.

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The Irony of Republicans’ ‘Tampon Tim’ Insult

E ven before the official announcement that Tim Walz would be named the vice presidential candidate on the Democratic ticket, the Internet churned out a cacophony of clips and quips reflecting his progressive bona fides. As Minnesota governor embracing a gaggle of children at the bill signing for free school breakfasts and lunches. As folksy dad joking with his daughter, a vegetarian, about whether turkey is meat. (According to Walz, “In Minnesota, turkey is special.”)

Amid these, a corresponding, more crude moniker arose: Tampon Tim. This time, an apparent conservative dig referencing Walz’s support for a 2024 state law that requires all Minnesota public schools to provide menstrual products in bathrooms.

There is an element of deja vu in the timing. Nearly nine years ago to the day, on August 8, 2015, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump hurled an insult at then-Fox newscaster Megyn Kelly: he accused her of having “blood coming out of her wherever” when he thought her debate questions were unfair. At the time, I wrote here at TIME : “Period jokes are a dime a dozen, Donald. Half of the American electorate–indeed, half the world’s population–copes with menstruation. But for those who live in poverty, lack of access to menstrual health care is more than a punch line.”

Now nearly a decade later, periods have become a mainstream public policy priority. Far from being mocked or maligned, “menstrual equity” is an agenda that enjoys broad bipartisan support across the country. So far, 30 states have eliminated state sales tax on menstrual products (also known as the “tampon tax"), including a law signed last year by the Republican governor of Texas, Greg Abbott . Minnesota is one of 28 states committed by law and/or budget to providing menstrual products in schools, joined by states with Republican leadership like Georgia, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Utah.

In fact, in 2018, Trump himself signed the first-ever federal menstrual access requirement into law—the First Step Act , a 2018 prison and sentencing reform package that mandates menstrual product provision in federal prisons. In 2020 he went on to sign the CARES Act , which made it possible for the first time for employees to use their Flexible Spending Account allowances to buy menstrual products with pre-tax dollars.

As for the latest round of name calling, it seems the aspect of the Minnesota law that has conservatives most agitated is its language: the law states that pads and tampons must be available to “all menstruating students” and “in restrooms regularly used by students in grades 4 to 12.” A failed attempt to amend the bill to only name “female restrooms,” did not keep it from passing as is with bipartisan support. Among its Republican supporters, Rep. Dean Urdahl remarked , “Just talking with my wife and family members, they felt like it was an important issue I should support.”

And it really should be that simple. Policies that address the economic burden of menstruation, and that acknowledge the educational value of treating period products as basic school supplies, have proven to be a popular and common sense reform—at home and abroad.

As a matter of political gamesmanship, zeroing in on any issue that implicates reproductive health, menstruation among them, is a risky gambit for Republicans. Poll after poll shows that the majority of Americans support reproductive rights and turn out to vote on the issue. In her role as Vice President, Kamala Harris has taken up the discussion around menstrual literacy and data protection as it pertains to abortion, for example. With Gov. Walz as a champion for fighting period poverty, it is a drum the ticket is wise to beat.

And finally, as Walz reminds us—anyone who thinks that period jokes are appropriate or funny is just plain, well, weird. 

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What to know about Walz's military record and Vance's accusations of 'stolen valor'

The Harris-Walz campaign issued a statement thanking Vance for his service.

Republican JD Vance is alleging Democrat Tim Walz is guilty of "stolen valor" -- an explosive allegation that supporters of Walz say goes too far.

The allegation also has legal implications. It's against federal law to lie about military service to try to defraud people.

While there's no evidence that Walz is guilty of such a crime, there are questions about how Walz has talked about his service, including claims that he carried a gun "in war," when he never saw active combat.

The Harris-Walz campaign issued a statement saying that "in his 24 years of service, the Governor carried, fired and trained others to use weapons of war innumerable times. Governor Walz would never insult or undermine any American's service to this country -- in fact, he thanks Senator Vance for putting his life on the line for our country. It's the American way."

Here’s what to know:

Walz retired from the Army National Guard as the crisis in Iraq was growing to run for political office.

By 2005, Tim Walz had logged 24 years with the Army National Guard and earned the rank of command sergeant major -- the highest enlisted rank for his unit and one with considerable responsibility.

MORE: Despite new criticism, Trump told Walz in 2020 he was 'very happy' with his handling of George Floyd protests

It was possible his unit would be sent to war, as Pentagon officials hoped the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq would protect the new coalition government and prevent a civil war.

Walz, a vocal critic of the Bush administration's war policies and father of a 4-year-old girl at the time, opted to file his retirement papers that May and run for public office instead.

Walz won, successfully flipping a Minnesota House seat from red to blue for the first time in years and becoming the highest-ranked enlisted veteran to serve in Congress.

According to records by the National Guard, the 1st Battalion of the 125th Field Artillery received an alert order on July 14, 2005, – two months after Walz retired. The mobilization order came in August and the unit mobilized in October.

Joseph Eustice, another retired command sergeant major who served with Walz, tells ABC News that while there was speculation of a deployment around that time there was no firm indication that Walz’s unit would be sent to Iraq until that July alert order.

Eustice says he remembers Walz struggling with the timing of wanting to serve as a lawmaker but also avoiding asking for a deferment so he could do so.

"He had a window of time. He had to decide. And in his deciding, we were not on notice to be deployed. There were rumors. There were lots of rumors, and we didn't know where we were going until it was later that, early summer, I believe,” Eustice told ABC News.

Vance said Walz as a command sergeant major at the time shouldn’t have allowed his unit to deploy without him.

"I think it's shameful to prepare [a] unit to go to Iraq to make a promise that you're going to follow through and then to drop out right before you actually have to go. I also think it's dishonest,” Vance said.

MORE: Tim Walz was the safe VP pick

White House Press Secretary Karine Jean Pierre said his record as someone who enlisted at age 17 and spent more than two decades in the Army National Guard "speaks for itself.”

Walz served as command sergeant major but didn't stay in that role long enough to keep it in retirement.

There's no evidence Walz broke any rules by retiring when he did. After more than 20 years of service with the National Guard, a person can retire at any point, regardless of where they are in their contract, according to the National Guard.

Walz had joined the Nebraska National Guard at age 17, later transferring to the Minnesota National Guard, spending a total of 24 years in the service.

According to experts, Walz's retirement would have to have been approved by his commander. Officials say retirement requests can be denied if a Guard unit is mobilized, though the ultimate decision is up to the unit commander.

What is noteworthy is that Walz still uses the rank of command sergeant major on his website.

Walz indeed achieved that rank in service in September 2004. But he would have had to serve in that particular role for three years to retire as one officially, according to the National Guard.

"After 24 years in the Army National Guard, Command Sergeant Major Walz retired from the 1-125th Field Artillery Battalion in 2005,” according to the governor's website.

Walz said he carried a gun "in war,” but he also has acknowledged he was never in direct combat.

In a video clip tweeted out by the Harris campaign on Tuesday, Walz tells an audience that he carried guns "in war” while trying to make the case for restrictions on gun access.

"We can research the impacts of gun violence. We can make sure those weapons of war, that I carried in war, are only carried in war,” Walz said.

Walz would have carried a gun during his service when the U.S. was at war following the 9/11 terror attacks, including a deployment to Italy in 2003 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

But there is no evidence that Walz was ever engaged in active combat, and he has acknowledged as much, according to a 2018 interview with Minnesota Public Radio.

"I know that there are certainly folks that did far more than I did. I know that," Walz said. "I willingly say that I got far more out of the military than they got out of me, from the GI Bill to leadership opportunities to everything else."

Still, Vance insists Walz's comment about carrying a gun "in war” and not "during war” is tantamount to stolen valor.

"What bothers me about Tim Walz is the stolen valor garbage. Do not pretend to be something that you're not,” he said.

Vance is a former Marine who served in Iraq but wrote in his memoir that he was "lucky to escape any real fighting.”

"I served in a combat zone. I never said that I saw a firefight myself, but I've always told the truth about my Marine Corps service. That's the difference," Vance said Wednesday.

ABC News' Isabella Murray and Alex Presha contributed to this report.

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Arizona Grand Jury Wanted to Indict Trump in Fake Electors Case

Court papers show that grand jurors signaled their interest in charging the former president, only to have state prosecutors advise against it because of similarities to a federal case against him.

• Share full article

By Alan Feuer and Danny Hakim

A state grand jury in Arizona that charged 18 people this spring in a scheme that sought to overturn Donald J. Trump’s 2020 election loss wanted to indict him, too, according to court papers released on Tuesday.

But prosecutors, the papers said, recommended that Mr. Trump should not be charged, citing a Justice Department policy that discourages bringing state and federal cases against the same defendant that are largely based on similar facts.

The court papers, filed in Phoenix by the Arizona attorney general’s office, revealed for the first time that the grand jurors investigating allegations of interference in that state’s election seriously considered bringing charges against Mr. Trump. Some of the grand jurors even appeared to be upset when a state prosecutor suggested they should not.

“I have not recommended that in the draft indictment, despite clear indications from you all that there’s an interest in pursuing a charge against him,” the papers quoted the unnamed prosecutor as saying of Mr. Trump.

“I know that may be disappointing to some of you,” the prosecutor added.

When the Arizona case was filed in April, it accused some of Mr. Trump’s top allies of conspiring with a group of Republican operatives to create a slate of fake electors who declared he had won the race in Arizona when the actual winner was Joseph R. Biden Jr. Among those charged were Rudolph W. Giuliani, who had been Mr. Trump’s personal lawyer, and Mark Meadows, his former White House chief of staff.

Though Mr. Trump was never charged in the case and his name did not appear in the 58-page indictment, he was mentioned several times as Unindicted Co-Conspirator 1, described as “a former president of the United States who spread false claims of election fraud following the 2020 election.”

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